


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
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THESIS FOR THE DOCTORATE

The Principle of the Ego in Philosophy with
Special Reference to its Influence upon
Schlegel's Doctrine of "Ironie"

BY

AUGUSTA MANIE WILSON, A.M.



April, 1908

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of the Self involves profound thought in philosophic systems where it forms the fundamental principle.

There are two possible paths open to philosophic speculation: one based on the subject, or the soul within, the other on the object, or world without. The second method carries the philosopher into the depths of materialism, or the rigor of dogmatism.

The first method, where the Self is the keystone, leads to the various results of subjectivism, idealism, scepticism and "Ironie;" this latter, we purpose to show, finds its true source in the doctrine of the Self. As types of subjectivism and idealism, the Vedanta philosophy, the Socratic ethics, the Christian Self and the Fichtean Ego will be examined: as type of scepticism the Cartesian maxim.

The climax of the *Ego-lehre* is "Die Ironie": when the subjective Self formulates ideals to which it strives to attain, and the awful gulf between the real and ideal is perceived, in the endless striving and longing for a goal, the "Ironie" is experienced. This "Ironie" was first defined by Friedrich Schlegel. His doctrine influenced and affected many writers, the "Ironie" leading them into a world of dream or phantasy, but at length culminating in the darkest pessimism.

I. PRINCIPLE OF THE SELF—HISTORICAL ORIENTATION.

I. *With Vedanta.*

In earliest Hindoo thought, the Vedic hymns were addressed to thirty-three gods; then came a longing for one, who might be a god of gods, and such a being was Prajapati, who was conceived of as having a locality and moving about the earth. Not yet content, a deity, Brahman was worshipped, and finally came a philosophic conception of the Self, where Brahman is identified with the ego and the Self is in all. It is a pantheistic form of religion, wherein the Ego is the Infinite and everything is a manifestation of the Self.

The Upanishads contain the philosophy of the Vedas, i. e., Vedanta. Their aim was to impress belief in one Spirit, who is the Creator; as also a faith in the world's reality, dependent on Brahman; and the human soul as identical with Brahman, whence it emanates. In the

Khandogya-Upanishad, the sacred syllable "Om" is explained as the essence of all in earth, sky, and man till Brahman is finally reached as the cause of the universe. This Brahman is "my self within the heart . . . he, from whom all works, all desires proceed, who embraces all this, who never speaks, and who is never surprised, he is myself within my heart, is the Brahman. When I shall have departed from hence, I shall obtain him (that Self)."¹ "The subtle essence of all that exists is the True, is the Self, and Thou art it (*Tat twam asi*)."² The Infinite is everywhere, but it is the Self, from which all things spring. He who sees this shall not taste death but shall enter the City of Brahman and secure freedom from all worlds and cares.

The Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad is based on the tenet "I am a Brahman" (*aham brahma asmi*).³ In the beginning was the Self, or Brahman, who created all things, in earth, in sky, in spirit world. This Brahman is "thy Self, the Immortal, the Imperishable."⁴

The Vedanta is the culmination of the doctrine of the Upanishads. It attempts to explain the statements set forth in the Upanishads, "*tat twam asi*," and "*aham brahma asmi*," and asks why are we not conscious of the identification of Self and Brahman, and why is there the difficulty of Self vs. not-Self, the subject and the object? Vedanta answers that the difficulty arises through ignorance, or illusion (Maya). As mother-of-pearl appears silver, as a rope may seem a snake, or the moon as double, so the Self appears as two through Maya. The theology of the Vedanta consists in emancipation and cessation from transmigration. When Self is known to be one with Brahman, there is complete liberation from care and the soul goes to Brahman, never to return. The cosmology presents two views: an empirical world for the transmigration of souls and a metaphysical world where Brahman and the soul are identical; where there is no beginning, no continuance, no end. "As clay vessels are clay, but differ in name, so all is Brahman, differing in name. The world has no existence, is all Brahman."⁵ Cause and effect are identical, the substance persists in changes of its qualities, world is an objectification of the Self. The empirical world is illusion, or Maya.

The psychology in Vedanta that the soul alone is real is the forerunner of Descartes, "*Cogito, ergo sum*." The soul is one with Brahman, not part, but the whole; it is all powerful. Rebirth is due to the fact that the soul's own nature is hidden under various

¹ Kh-U. III. 14: 3, 4. (Max Müller Sacred Books, Vol. I.)

² K. U. VI. 8. 7.

³ B. U. 1-4, 10—(Sacred Books, Vol. XV.)

⁴ B. U. 3. 7, 8.

⁵ K. U. VI. 1. 4.

conditions which prevent total identification with Brahman. After death begins the migration of the soul; the bad man is born again as a lower animal; the man with lower knowledge enters into lower Brahman, descends into a higher caste and by progressive emancipation enters finally into eternal and absolute Nirvana; the soul with higher knowledge reaches immediate emancipation. This is the keynote of Vedanta, emancipation through knowledge of the Self, hidden in the body, "a patched-together hiding place."¹ This knowledge is attained by study of Veda, renunciation of pleasure, attainment of control of body, meditation and contemplation of "*tat tvam asi*." Knowledge immediately identifies Self with Brahman, and sees the non-reality of the world. There is no world, no body, no pain for the knowing one for "I am a Brahman," non-actor and non-enjoyer. At the moment of death, a complete and eternal emancipation begins for the enlightened one. He is a Brahman and in Brahman is he merged. "As rivers run, and in the ocean renouncing name and form, from vision vanish, so names and forms the enlightened Sage renouncing, enters great Brahman, the all-embracing Spirit."²

With complete emancipation, comes annihilation of Self; Absolute Nirvana is reached but with the nihilism of the soul, a blotting out of things. Death is the end of all. From the most definite and real worship of many gods, Hindoo thought passed to the most indefinite and unreal Self and this belief embodied in the Vedanta philosophy culminates in nihilism, a complete obliteration of Self.

2. *The Socratic Self-knowledge.*

Previous to the conquest of Persia, the Greeks had been ruled by tradition and custom; laws were followed blindly with unquestioned belief in their validity. Now the Sophists declared "Man is the measure of all things," what each man thinks is for him the truth. From the study of the cosmos, Greek thought had turned to the study of man. Natural law was now opposed to law of custom; the Sophists held that natural law was the only genuine law and that opinions of men were to reign supreme. Contrary to this idea, Socrates emphasized the elements of knowledge and reason. The Sophists obeyed law if for their own interests and put an end to a blind following of law. Socrates agreed with their purpose but urged all to follow the law by the use of reason, and to obey the law, because it was the law.

¹ B. U. 4-4-11.

² 3 Mundaka.

Socrates held that it were better to do wrong knowingly, than the right blindly, and made a universal truth of "Virtue is knowledge of the good" and can be taught and sin is an error. The best kind of life is that which a man leads by the exercise of his reason and in strict conformity to law. According to Socrates, all excellence is insight, or exact knowledge. His maxim was "Know thyself." Man should know his own reason and have an exact knowledge of things in civil and political life. Socrates' purpose was the welfare of the State through the individual's self-knowledge. His was an ethical knowledge, seeking the happiness of all. He made the great distinction between opinion and knowledge by means of his irony. This irony, however, is not the modern doctrine, as will be seen when comparison is made later. His is a dialectic irony, which is evident in the dialogues of Plato.¹ By a pretended abnegation of his own knowledge, the adversary's opinions are put in the foreground until all further argument to support them is impossible and the opinions sink to naught by their own absurdity. By feigning ignorance and dullness, he drew out the opinions of others and finally caused the opponent to pass judgment on himself. He dropped his own individuality, that others might see the error in opinions and be led to self-knowledge by reason. Here we again see the spirit of nihilism, in the abnegation of Self, that reason and knowledge may reign and an ethical eudæmonism be brought about in the State.

3. *The Self in Christianity.*

Ancient life was characterized by a feeling of naïve complacency, but even with the Stoics is discerned a feeling of need for a higher power to save us and lead us to the ideal of virtue. A feeling of unrest abounds caused by the self-diremption of the human soul. The Neo-Platonists attain rest only in the moment of ecstasy when the personality of the individual is lost in the Absolute.

Religion has its origin in the Self. The religious feeling is within man's own nature.

Man contemplates the evil and discontent about him and longs for salvation from these ills. He needs help and so a Deity is formulated. Man worships and by God's help may be saved.

Christianity sets up the dualism of soul and world. Man must negate the world in order to save his soul, he must lose his body to find his soul's salvation. The goal of the Ego's striving through life

¹ Cf. Theætetus, Philebus, Gorgias.

is the "Kingdom of God." The Ego must renounce the world and all egoistic natural desires and become one with the Infinite in the Eternal Kingdom. Man is free to develop his own character and to realize the Kingdom, and God is supreme in perfecting this home. Both man and God have one goal, the Kingdom. The Ego must lose himself and become one with God. There is a complete renunciation and resignation of the Ego in Christianity. The worldly individual must be negated and the spiritual soul affirmed. Again the Ego loses its identity, merged in the Infinite in the Kingdom of God.

4. *The Cartesian Self.*

Descartes' theory is dependent upon the "inner experience" of St. Augustine and the ontological proof of God's existence set forth by Anselm. He was the modern sceptic, he began by doubting and changed Anselm's "*Credo, ut intelligam*" to "*dubito, ut intelligam*." As the senses deceive, he finds it necessary to exercise thought in order to doubt. In this, he is a rationalist. I doubt, therefore I think; and if I think, I am. Thus "*Cogito, ergo sum*,"¹ the maxim was established that the thinking being, the Self, exists. This is comparable to the Vedanta conception of the identification of all in the Self. If the Self exists, all else exists. The soul is the thinking thing (*res cogitans*) and the body, the object projected by thought (*res extensa*).² This antithesis has set the problem for modern thought; the soul is a thing and its content is thought; then, how does the inner soul relate to the external body, how can subjective relate to objective?

Descartes applies the attribute of extension and declares interaction to be a miracle. It is a real but unintelligent connection, due to the pineal gland of the brain. There is a dualism, but *mens* and *corpus* are on the same level with a possible relation. His "*cogito, ergo sum*" is a truth grasped by immediate intuition; it forms one of the elementary truths of consciousness. Innate ideas are clear and distinct ideas, non-deducible, ground solely in themselves. They are as clear and distinct as self-consciousness and he cannot doubt consciousness. Judgment as to the distinction between distinct and confused presentations is founded on the will power. Descartes' ethics rest on this method; from distinct knowledge follows right willing and acting; from the confused impulses, result sin and error. This ethical ideal reminds one of Socrates' rule of reason over sense.

¹ Meditations II. and VI.

² Meditations II. and VI.

Descartes made a threefold division of the world; mind, matter and God. Then as substance is that which can be conceived of as itself alone, mind and matter are not substances as they cannot be conceived of as apart from God; so only God exists. He overcomes dualism by relating all things to God. Mind and matter no longer exist. All merge into God as the Brahmanic Self into Nirvana.

5. *The Fichtean Ego.*

With Fichte, Cartesianism seems to be inverted; not "*Cogito*," but "*Ago*," not thought but "*Thathandlung*." Goethe's "*Faust*," about this time meditates on "*Im Anfang war die That*."¹ This forms the basis of the Fichtean philosophy. His is a voluntaristic method, following a dialectical movement. The Ego posits itself (*Das Ich setzt sich selbst, weil es ist.*)² Fichte would say "*sum, ergo sum*," (*Ich bin Ich*) not "*Cogito, ergo sum*." It is the nature of this Ego to act, not in a contemplative direction, but ethically. The Ego therefore opposes to itself a Non-ego on which it acts and reacts. (*Aber das dem Ich entgegengesetzte ist-Nicht-Ich.*)³ The outer world is nothing, except a projection of the Ego, and exists as an obstacle which the Ego must overcome in order to develop character.

The Ego's self-activity (*Thathandlung*)⁴ acting on the world will result in "*die sittliche Weltordnung*." We have first the affirmation and activity of a subject; second, an object, world, a product of the Ego, and opposed for ethical development; and third, a limitation, as Ego and Non-ego act on each other as will and thought meet. How can Ego and Non-ego, be considered together, without canceling each other? They mutually limit each other. (*Sein und Nicht-sein Realität und Negation werden sich gegenseitig einschränken*).⁵ To limit means a canceling in part; the Non-ego is what the Ego is not, and vice versa. Ego and Non-ego possess reality, divisibility, and negation. They may be united thus: *Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen*.⁶ Such a synthesis posits activity (*Thätigkeit*)⁷ and may be called the synthesis of causality (*Wirksamkeit*).⁸ The Ego represents the active cause, and the Non-ego, the passive effect.⁹ The Ego is a feeling Ego and posits a Non-ego (*ein Objekt*)¹⁰ upon which it reflects and contemplates; a reflecting Ego, and a reflected Ego, or Non-ego. The Ego is free in acting, but if it

1 *Faust*—Thomas ed. Pt. I. l. 1237.

2 *Werke*—Band I. s. 96, 97.

3 *Werke*—Band I. s. 104.

4 *Ibid.* s. 91.

5 *Ibid.* s. 108.

6 *Ibid.* s. 110.

7 *Ibid.* s. 136.

8 *Ibid.* s. 136.

9 *Ibid.* s. 137.

10 *Ibid.* s. 200.

reflects on the act, it ceases to be free and the act becomes product. Here arises the distinction between reality and ideality, representation and the thing-in-itself. Freedom, or the Ego's activity, is the uniting link. The Ego must posit itself, and it also posits a Non-ego; there a centripetal and here a centrifugal force; there as an Ego reflecting and here as reflected upon. The relation of the infinite self-activity of the Ego to its object is a tendency toward self-determination, an unending strife; (*Eine Tendenz zur Bestimmung, ein Streben, ein unendliches Streben.*)¹

This striving is an impulse (*ein Trieb*)² in the subject which forces it to posit a Non-ego, and the counter activity of the Non-ego is a check (*Gegenstreben*), the balance of the two is feeling (*Gefühl*). In the feeling is united activity (*Thätigkeit*) and limitation (*Beschränkung.*). This feeling is caused by reflection; the activity is a yearning (*Sehnen*)³; an impulse toward the unknown, a dissatisfaction (*Misbehagen*) and a want (*Leere*) to be filled. In yearning, ideality and impulse (*Trieb nach Realität*) are closely united.⁴ If the Ego posits this harmony it must also posit an opposite which would be accompanied by a feeling of disapproval (disharmony between impulse and act). The harmonious is to be impulse (*Trieb*) and act (*Handlung*). Each is to determine and be determined together. If an impulse produced itself, merely for impulse, it would be an act like the categorical imperative, simply because it is done with self-determination, without an object. They should be reciprocally related; then harmony and satisfaction (*Zufriedenheit*) prevail. This lasts only a little, as yearning returns. If act is opposed to impulse, a feeling of dissatisfaction arises, a self-diremption of the subject (*der Entzweiung des Subjekts mit sich selbst*).⁵

The Ego is the basis from which regularity and harmony proceed. Reality is simply the product of the Ego; "*Die Philosophie lehrt uns alles im Ich aufsuchen.*"⁶ Back of all is the moral will, which creates the world, for a field of action. Fichte's is an idealism, which sees in all things a product of consciousness. "*Was man für ein Mensch ist*"⁷ determines his philosophy. The activity of the Ego is to develop character. It was the individualism and ethics of Fichte which the Romanticists followed. "*In ihrem innersten Kern war die Wissenschaftslehre Ethik; die moralische Weltordnung war das Herz, von dem sie die Pulse des Alls ausgehen liess.*"⁸ Fichte's distinction between the

1 Ibid. s. 261.

2 Ibid. s. 288.

3 Ibid. s. 302.

4 Ibid. s. 320.

5 s. 328.

6 s. 412.

7 s. 434.

8 Haym's *Romantische Schule*—s. 218, 219.

absolute and the empirical Ego formed a problem for Friedrich Schlegel. Kant had separated noumenon and phenomenon and now Fichte declared that the absolute Ego rules in philosophy, yet since complete freedom remains an ideal, the absolute is never reached. Fichte does not advance beyond Kant. The activity of the Ego, to reach the ideal exerted a great influence on the period of Romanticism.

Let us, however, briefly sum up these five phases of self-doctrine: with Vedanta, Self was the Infinite; the individual Self must be annihilated and identified with the Brahmanic Self, before Nirvana could be enjoyed; it results in total obliteration of the personal self—nihilism. In the Socratic ethics, Socrates denied himself in order to develop others; this was an effacement of the personal to bring about a eudæmonistic result in the State. The Christian Self must be lost, so that it can be found in the "Kingdom"; it is a loss of Self on earth for a new Self above. The Cartesian sceptic must believe in personal existence and in a God's existence and blends the Self in the true substance, God; like the Vedanta, the individual is absorbed by the Infinite.

Therefore we have found that the personal must be done away with in order to realize a greater Self or realm. With Fichte, we have the transition to the Romantic School. The Fichtean Ego does not become obliterated but strives in endless activity to realize itself in a world, which it posits. This Ego positing an ideal, never reaches the Absolute, but ceaselessly strives for the goal.

Let us now examine the Romantic period to study the Fichtean influence and to find where the striving Ego will lead us.

II. IDEALS OF ROMANTICISM; THEIR ORIGIN.

Two years before the close of the eighteenth century in Berlin a reaction in philosophy and literature was expressed by the new Romantic School. How did it arise?

German thought had been passing through an age of Enlightenment, with Winckelmann and Lessing as the chief representatives. It was a period marked by "narrowness of vision, a crude intellectual complacency, utter absence of imagination and extreme utilitarianism"¹ The supremacy of reason was to be established by means of æsthetical criticism. According to Winckelmann, the ancients formulated their ideals of beauty in much the same way as Socrates formed the ethical

¹ Boyesen—Essays, p. 285.

concepts. Through the dialogue, Socrates learned his opponents' opinions and united these into a universal; so Phidias and Praxiteles formed a composite ideal from a feature here and there. These ideals, though beautiful, were not characteristic; but Winckelmann lays emphasis on the passiveness of these classical ideals; "*Nach diesem Begriff soll die Schönheit sein, wie das vollkommenste Wasser, welches je weniger Geschmack es hat, desto gesunder geachtet wird, weil es von fremden Theilen geläutert wird.*"¹ The absence of qualities, "*eine stille Grösse und edle Einfalt,*" mark the finest art which appeals to the intellect, not the emotions.

Lessing accepts this theory and it forms the nucleus of his "Laokoon, or Theory of Limits." Art must be beautiful, so Laokoon does not scream; this would be unfitting as art must represent what is static and permanent. Art, i. e., painting and sculpture, is limited in the spatial realm as it must show co-existence. Poetry appeals to the mind through the ear and employs the medium of time. Art has its limits. Lessing sets up the antique ideal of quietude and complacency as the type of pure art.

In religion, also, Lessing endeavored to emphasize the rational. In his "Erziehung des Menschen Geschlechts" he argues the problem, "*Die zufälligen Geschichtswahrheiten können nie der Beweis für die ewigen Vernunftwahrheiten werden,*" by making revelation for the race, analogous to education of the individual. Revelation is a means of communicating the truths of God's Fatherhood and Kingdom and the soul's immortality. It was an intellectualistic revelation for it confined itself to the communication of speculative knowledge.²

During this period literary men were seeking to revive interest in Greek authors and ancient life. Goethe evinces this tendency in his "Iphigenie" and "Tasso" and Schiller also in his "Braut von Messina."

The Germans, emotional and imaginative as they are, were not content with the lack of these traits in the classic art and literature and sought relief. The outcome was the Romantic School, opposed to the art formalism of Winckelmann and Lessing and to the classicism in Goethe and Schiller. The new school was marked by the enthusiasm of its founders. The fundamental idea was the reconciliation of poetry and philosophy.

Romanticism despised prosaic utility and sought to find artistic expression. Classicism had been characterized by complacency and quietude; objectivity and a satisfaction in Nature; Romanticism empha-

¹ Winckelmann Werke, lib. 4 cap. 2 § 23.

² Cf. Erziehung d. mensch. Geschlechts, trans. by Robertson.

sized first of all subjectivity, evinced by the writer's aspiration and vague longing. Paulsen says, "The Greek ideal of life, revived, is an æsthetical, rather than practical ideal. Not general utility but the perfection and manifestation of the personality is the function of the free man. This view reached its climax in Romanticism: Its program was to despise utility and prose, to worship the individual and poetry, in literature and in life."¹ The movement, in the second place, portrayed a love of the picturesque and strange mystery. Tieck, called the "Pioneer of Romanticism," thrills the reader with his fantastic legends and "*Märchen*" and in

"Mondbeglänzte Zaubernacht,
Die den Sinn gefangen hält,
Wundervolle Märchenwelt,
Steig' auf in der alten Pracht"²,

he voices the motto of the School. Lastly we discern a reactionary spirit against materialism, a retroactive spirit against classicism, and an attempt to revivify mediævalism. Wackenroder revived enthusiasm over Christian art by his Madonna-worship, extravagant but sincere.

Schlegel in the "Athenæum" declares that "*Die französische Revolution, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, und Goethe's Meister sind die grössten Tendenzen des Zeitalters*,"³ and according to Novalis, these great influences philosophical, political and poetical were brought to bear in the development of the Romantic School. Kant and Fichte contributed much to the new era through their philosophy.

(a). *Philosophical.*

Kant, in the "Critique of Judgment," creates an epoch in æsthetics. He appears as a mediator between the sensationalism of the English Burke, and the rationalism of the German Baumgarten. The former defines the beautiful as "that which pleases" and the latter declares it to be "perfection apprehended through the senses by the intellect." Kant makes æsthetics an independent science; to judge whether a thing is beautiful, or no, requires taste, and the judgment of taste is æsthetical; it is a subjective feeling. We must examine our own impressions, and impartially survey the object without interest.⁴ Anything that pleases our senses arouses inclination and a desire for satisfaction, and the person whose interest has been aroused and who then enjoys

¹ Paulsen's Ethics.

² Tieck Schriften (1828)—Bd. I. s. 36. Prolog to K. Octavianus.

³ Fr. Schlegel Prosaische Jugendschriften, ed. J. Minor (Wien 1906), Band II. Ath. § 216.

⁴ Critique of Judgment, trans. by J. H. Bernard, p. 55 et seq.

dispenses with judgment. The pleasant pleases immediately. A good or useful object may be pleasing but the idea of its purpose must bring the pleasure of the senses under the principle of reason to call it good. We feel an interest in its use or goodness; and satisfaction in the good presupposes the reason of its goodness. It is desire determined by reason. The pleasant and the good relate to desire, seeking satisfaction.

The judgment of taste is contemplative; it is disinterested and free. All interest presupposes a desire; we satisfy our inclinations, as hunger and thirst; we obey and respect the moral law, the categorical imperative, but taste differs from these. "It only plays with the objects of satisfaction."¹ The beautiful is, therefore, that which pleases without interest. This applies to all men, and is of universal validity. It is not founded on concepts, as are logical judgments, but is purely subjective. The pleasant is pleasing to each one as each one has his own taste; the beautiful is not beautiful for one, but is beautiful if all agree with him. Taste may apply to the pleasant but only in the latter case is it universal. The good depends on concepts of the good which are universal; the beautiful is like the good, universal but without a concept. "The beautiful, therefore, is that which pleases universally, without requiring a concept."² Such universality is subjective; in judgments of taste the faculties of the imagination and the understanding have free play. Pleasure follows the judgment and we impute our pleasure to someone else. The subjective element consists in the more lively play of both these mental powers animated by mutual agreement.³ This subjectivity and "free play" of the imagination are the great influences on Romanticism.

Kant makes judgments of pleasure empirical; those of morality *a priori*, while those of beauty rest on *a priori* principles, but are synthetic and of subjective validity. Beauty is caused by the free play of the cognitive faculties, receiving a regular play of impressions, and is evinced in either figure or play. In pantomime, and dancing, it is the play of figures, in tune, the play of sensations. "The judgment is called æsthetical, because it depends on the feeling of harmony in the play of the mental powers."⁴

A product of art is caused by a free play of the representative powers⁵ and is not necessarily regular and symmetrical. Art differs from handicraft because the first is free, regarded as play, i. e., an occupation that is pleasant in itself. The best art is produced where

¹ Ibid. p. 55.

² Ibid. p. 67.

³ Ibid. p. 64; cf. 71, 93.

⁴ Ibid. p. 80.

⁵ Ibid. p. 98.

all constraint is removed, and thus from work, it is changed to "mere play."¹

Kant divides beautiful arts into arts of speech, formative arts, and the arts of the "play" of sensations. Arts of speech are rhetoric and poetry; the orator gives us an entertaining "play" of the imagination, while the poet announces a "mere play" with ideas.² The formative arts are sculpture, architecture and painting; these furnish entertainment of the imagination in free play with ideas and the æsthetical judgment, is merely a play, without purpose. The arts of the "play" of sensations, produced externally, are music and color. "Music is the beautiful play of sensations, or a play of pleasant sensations."³ Kant places music last of the arts as it only plays with sensations. Rhetoric and poetry, although a play, carry on a serious business.⁴ Further free play of sensations is evinced in play of fortune (games of chance), play of tones (music) and the play of thought (wit)⁵; the first arouse interest, and are not beautiful; the second changes from bodily sensations to æsthetical ideas; the third shows an animated mind, without interest. Jokes begin with the thoughts which occupy the body and pass to æsthetical ideas.⁶

Kant contributed the ideas of subjectivity and "free play" to the Romanticists. In his "Critique of Pure Reason" he likewise uses the word "play;" if in our thought we have subjective perception of an object, but no objective equivalent, we should have a "mere play of representations, unconnected with any object."⁷ Our concepts are empty; "we have thought in them, but have not arrived at any knowledge. We have only "played" with representations."⁸ With Kant, all things converge to the synthetic unity of apperception, the conscious "I." So in his æsthetics, all is subjective, all is of the "I."

Fichte follows Kant with a philosophy, the basis of which is "*Das Ich*." As seen in the "Wissenschaftslehre," the "Ich" posits itself, and also an opposing object, the world, or "Nicht-Ich;" this latter forms an obstacle, which being overcome, develops the character of the "Ich." It exists only for an ethical purpose, to develop character. There are then two facts, "*Das Ich*" and its ethical self-activity (*Die That-handlung*.)

Romantic writings were sentimental, artistic and emotional. Fichte was ethical; how does the ethical Fichte relate to the æsthetical Romanticism? The Romanticists accepted the concept of "*Das Ich*," as the basis of their art. The principal elements for them were subjectivity

1 Ibid. p. 185.

2 Ibid. p. 207, 208.

3 Ibid. p. 212, 213, 218.

4 Ibid. p. 219.

5 Ibid. p. 221.

6 Ibid. p. 222, 223.

7 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 159.

8 Ibid. p. 127.

and originality. It is true, they introduced the picturesque background of the Middle Ages, but the main thought sprang from the Self. The result, oftentimes, seemed odd and eccentric, due to marvelous creations of the imagination. The Self created ideals, to which it could never attain; the struggle was vain, the Self could not reach the goal.

The second connecting link, we find to be the idea of Culture. Fichte's extreme moralism did not exclude an idea which was central to Romanticism; it was the idea of Culture. The ethical with Fichte included both poetry and politics, because his conception of morality was broad.

In his "Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile über die französische Revolution," he uses the word "Culture" many times. It is the first marked use of the word found in philosophy¹ although Kant uses it in his "Critique of Pure Reason," "culture, which is intended to form a certain kind of skill, without destroying another kind which is already present"² and "Metaphysics is the completion of the whole culture of human reason."³

The French Revolution had been a struggle for political freedom. Rousseau's works cried out for freedom, through a complete return to nature. The French took up this idea of the rule of the individual, and how did it culminate? By bloodshed and a Reign of Terror. Fichte finds it necessary to follow a very different path to attain freedom.⁴ It is by means of Culture.

None of our own impulses have any value, except in so far as they affect our Culture ("*Nichts in der Sinnenwelt, nichts von unserem Treiben, Thun oder Leiden, hat einen Werth, als insofern es auf Cultur wirkt*").⁵ In attempting the freedom of "*Das Ich*," the first act is the "*Bezähmung der Sinnlichkeit*;" the second is the "*Cultur der Sinnlichkeit*." "Culture is the exercise (*Uebung*) of all of our powers (*Kräfte*) toward the goal of complete freedom (*Zweck der völligen Freiheit*); of complete independence of all which is not pure Self (*reines Selbst*)."⁶ This Culture arises through and from the self-activity of "*Das Ich*;" it depends on the use of freedom and affects freedom. Fichte refers to the French Revolution as a means of Culture, "*Der Krieg cultivirt*;"⁷ by means of war strong souls are roused to heroic feelings and deeds; weak souls become coarse and oppressive. Also, "*der härteste Despotismus cultivirt*;"⁸ the slave hears in the death

¹ Eucken—Modern Phil. Concepts, trans. by M. S. Phelps—p. 216.

² Critique of Pure Reason—trans. Max Müller, p. 570 [710].

³ Critique of Pure Reason—trans. Max Müller, p. 682 [851].

⁴ Ueber die fr. Rev.—; Sämmtliche Werke, Bd. VI. s. 71.

⁵ Ibid. s. 86.

⁶ Ibid. s. 86.

⁷ Ibid. s. 90, 91.

⁸ Ibid. s. 91.

sentence the promise of an everlasting freedom and peace. But these means of culture should not be employed.

Fichte asks what was the goal in the founding and government of the country? The answer gives two aims; (a) *Alleinherrschaft eures Willen im Innern* and (b) *Verbreitung eurer Grenzen von Aussen*. He accepts the first as a means to the highest aim, *Cultur zur Freiheit*; and compares the second with this final aim and finds it cannot injure Culture, whether few or many thousands will be affected.¹ He speaks of three kinds of freedom; transcendental, the same in all rational beings; cosmological, only possessed by the Eternal, but aimed at by all mortals, to be dependent on naught outside Self; political, or the right to acknowledge no law except what man gives himself. This should be in every state; "*Cultur der Freiheit soll der einzige Endzweck der Staats-verbinding sein.*"² Society (*Gesellschaft*) and state differ but neither can give Culture; but "*Beider Einfluss auf unsere Cultur verhält sich wie ihr beiderseitigen Gebiet.*"³ One who receives Culture from the state will not turn it against the state; but man must work for the highest goal of all "*moralischen Wesen*" through Culture. Man has a right and it is his duty to seek means of Culture; Culture is mine, as my property is and does not belong to the state.

As his second definition of Culture, Fichte gives "the restraining and rooting out of our own erring inclinations (*fehlerhaften Neigungen*), which oppose the awakening of reason (*Erwachen unserer Vernunft*) and the feeling of our own self-activity (*Gefühl unserer Selbstthätigkeit*); and also the modifying of external things and changing them according to our concepts. (*Begriffe*)"⁴. Culture is capable of great variety, but differs only in degree. Culture is the highest means by which man can reach self-harmony (*Uebereinstimmung mit sich selbst*); it is the means of moral perfection; "*Die Sinnlichkeit soll cultivirt werden.*"⁵

Fichte's aim is the spreading of Culture and the elevation of humanity.⁶ He carries it into politics where "culture creates the political aim."⁷ It is possible to obtain political freedom and he voices it in "The true Fatherland is that state which is most highly cultured."⁸ This idea of Culture was used by Fichte in an ethical sense, even in politics; it was the restraint of impulse and it aimed for absolute freedom of Self and state. The Romanticists put an æsthetical cast on the idea of "*Cultur*"; they aimed to revive the study of the Middle

¹ Ibid. s. 92.

² Band VI. s. 101.

³ Ibid. s. 139.

⁴ Ibid. s. 298.

⁵ Ibid. s. 298, 299.

⁶ Ibid. s. 301.

⁷ Band VII. s. 146.

⁸ Band VII. s. 212.

Ages, but they are closely related to Fichte through the concepts of the "*Ich*" and "*Cultur*," the latter being the free activity of the former.

(b) *Political*.

The political influence on Romanticism was derived from the French Revolution. A return to nature, where absolute freedom would be enjoyed, was advocated by Rousseau. In a state of nature, we would find primitive man, not in a state of peace, but in war ("*Bellum omnium contra omnes*"), says Hobbes, the English thinker, and what was the result with civilized man? A Revolution, whereby freedom was not won. In this period, however, the ideas of egoism and freedom of the Ego were paramount and these were to exert a great influence on the Romantic School. Kant, with his subjectivity and free play in æsthetics; Fichte, with the subject and its free activity, expressed as Culture, in ethics and politics, and the French Revolution with its egoism and freedom, all powerfully influenced the enthusiasts of Romanticism.

(c) *Poetical*.

From the realm of poetic art, we choose Goethe and Schiller as influencing the School. With Goethe and his "*Wilhelm Meister*," the influence is a negative one; the book tells of the desire of a youth to attain happiness. His egoistic attempts were void of the desired result, and it is not until he serves his fellowmen that happiness comes to him. It portrays a growth from egoism to altruism; it also purposed to show the breaking up of a feudal system into an industrial society. A man, Goethe believed, should be ranked according to his utility. In "*Faust*," the same doctrine is put forth. It is based on the Fichtean activity (*Thathandlung*): "*Im Anfang war die That*"¹ and "*Die That ist alles, nichts der Ruhm*."² The egoistic sensual pleasures, then those of self-culture and self-fame are in vain, and only when "*Faust*" drains the large morass and secures health and happiness for posterity, can he say "*Verweile doch, du bist so schön!*"³ In the "*Leiden des jungen Werthers*," the letters teem with the cry for happiness, but the egoistic longing for self-satisfaction ends in suicide.

The Romanticists deemed these works lacking in art and imagination and opposed Goethe with tales of idealism and imagination. They despised utility in all, but more especially in tales. Goethe exerted a

¹ Faust—Thomas ed.—Bk. I. l. 1237.

² Faust—Thomas ed.—Bk. II. l. 10188.

³ Ibid. Vol. II. line 11582.

positive influence, however, by his portrayal of freedom from moral restraints and his great emphasis on the individual and his activity.

Schiller follows Kant in his idea of play in æsthetics. Where Kant places the judgment of taste between the judgments of sense and of the good, Schiller places "beauty" between sense and morality. Schiller gives evidence of the influence of idealistic moralism from Kant, the great "Königsberger," and a lower realism from Goethe. "der grosse Heidner."

In his "Briefe," he opposes two natures in man, and attempts to prove this by metaphysical, psychological, ethical and æsthetical distinctions. We study the Ego, and distinguish something permanent, and something that changes; the first we call the person, the second, his condition. The person is permanent, a law in itself, whereas conditions change; but in all our conditions; moods, feelings, thoughts and acts we are the same person; these conditions do not arise from the person, and the path to unite person and condition would never find its goal.¹

The permanent personality is enclosed in reason and reflection; the changing is due to sense-perception. These may be called impulses, the one, relating to reason, the form-impulse (*Formtriebe*), and the other, relating to sense, the sensuous-impulse (*sinnliches Triebes*).² The sensuous-impulse relates to man's physical being and puts him in contact with matter; it is due to perception and demands continued change. The form-impulse relates to man's rational nature, and creates eternal laws and brings harmony into various conditions.³ The sense-impulse arouses inclination for the present need; the form-impulse shows man his eternal unchangeable duty for dignity of life (*Erhaltung des Lebens*) and maintenance of character (*Bewahrung der Würde*).⁴

These two impulses are to be reconciled, but how? Kant says there can be no other influence save duty in living the categorical imperative. Goethe in the "Confessions of a Fair Saint"⁵ does not unite inclination and reason, but shows the victory of reason over impulse. "My longing after the Invisible . . . is an impulse that leads me and guides me aright. I freely follow, knowing little of restraint."⁶

Schiller places the "*Spiel-trieb*" or "play-impulse" between the two which shall raise man to perfection, and set man free physically and

¹ "Ueber die æsthetische Erziehung des Menschen"; Brief 11.

² Brief 12.

³ Briefe 12, 13.

⁴ s. 390, Werke (Hempel).

⁵ Wilhelm Meister, trans. by Carlyle, Bk. VI. Vol. I., p. 340 et seq.

⁶ p. 397.

morally.¹ This is the consummation of humanity. The object of sensuous-impulse is life (*Leben*), and that of the form-impulse is form (*Gestalt*); the object of the "*Spieltrieb*" is beauty, or living form. The ancient statue is all self-satisfied form, but lacks life. Beauty must unite and balance reality and form; it must lead the sensuous man to form and perfection, and must lead the too spiritual man to matter. From the physical to the moral, we are led by the æsthetical. "*Das Spieltrieb*" is then a struggle in the soul of the artist to unite sense and reason. It is art. "Man is only entirely a man when he plays. Man shall only *play* with beauty, and shall play only with beauty"² (*der Mensch soll mit der Schönheit nur spielen, und er soll nur mit der Schönheit spielen.*") The genius is he who unites perfection of art and conduct.

With Fichte, the activity of the Ego was ethical, with Schiller æsthetical. With Kant and Schiller, beauty or art is only a "play" between sense and duty. Herbert Spencer speaks of a "play activity," but his is biological; it is merely surplus of vigor, ideal excitement such as is seen in the play of kittens, and heard in the song of the birds. The savage, after the hunt, carves his implements of war and the chase because he possesses extra activity and it expresses itself in crude attempts at art. Art with Spencer is "play activity," or surplus vigor; with Schiller is a "play" with beauty, a means of passing from the sensuous to the moral.³ There are three epochs in man's development; man in his physical state endures only forces of nature; he frees himself in the æsthetical condition, and governs them in the moral state.

When Schiller discusses poetry, he makes similar distinctions. Poetry may be naïve or sentimental. As a child in its simplicity needs no art to make it great, so simplicity in nature triumphs over art; if unconsciously, it is "simplicity as surprise" (*Ueberraschung*); if consciously, it is "simplicity of feeling" (*Gesinnung*).⁴ The child seems an ideal, and as we realize what we are not, sadness is aroused, and we strive for this that we are not and this is sentimentality. "Genius is simple, or it is not genius" (*Naiv muss jedes wahre Genie sein, oder es ist keines*).⁵ It must be guided by nature and instinct, not by laws. Nature is as it should be, but we have become free and have fled from nature; we regret this and long to get back; we long for happiness and for the perfection we should find there. The ancient Greeks felt naturally, so there is no sadness there; their life, even their religion was founded on simple nature; the moderns have lost nature, except in

1 Briefe 14, 15, 16.

2 Schiller Werke (Berlin—Hempel)—(15)
s. 392.

3 Brief 24.

4 Werke—s. 474 (Hempelausgabe).
5 Ibid. s. 479.

childhood, and are discontented with humanity and strive to find their lost happiness.

"The poet is the guardian of nature (*Bewahrer der Natur*)";¹ he either expresses nature, or seeks it. Therefore we have two kinds of poetry, naïve or simple, and sentimental. Schiller calls Homer and Shakespeare, naïve poets, lost in nature and we forget the poet in his subject. Goethe in "Werther" evinces this same naïve love of nature.² The sentimental poet seeks nature. The naïve poet imitates the real, as he sees it; the modern poet represents an ideal as for him the real does not exist. Ideal humanity will unite these views; "*Natur macht ihn mit sich eins, die Kunst trennt und entzweit ihn, durch das Ideal kehrt er zur Einheit zurück.*"³

The simple poet imitates the real, and is content; the sentimental poet reflects on nature and expresses the real and ideal. Which will predominate? In satirical poetry, the real is contrasted with the ideal showing the distance things are from nature. It may be humorous or pathetic satire. In elegaic poetry, either nature or the ideal are objects of sadness, as lost to man, or both are objects of joy, being represented as reality; the first is elegy, the second, the idyl. Rousseau is an elegaic poet seeking nature; Klopstock and Kleist are others who seek the ideal. Goethe's "Werther" expresses the sentimental longing also in "Alas, when we have attained our object, we are as poor as ever, and our souls still languish for unattainable happiness."⁴ "The idyl presents the idea of an innocent and happy humanity; man in a state of innocence; it is humanity reconciled with itself; it is union of inclination and duty (*Vereinigung der Neigungen mit dem Gesetze einer zur höchsten sittlichen Würde*); it is the ideal of beauty applied to real life (*Ideal der Schönheit auf das wirkliche Leben angewendet*)."⁵

It reconciles the real and the ideal.

The simple poet is limited by sensuous reality; whereas the sentimental poet has absolute unconditional freedom. The first accomplishes his object, but is limited; the second does not attain his goal, but has an unlimited goal. The simple poet needs help from without, whereas the sentimental poet is his own genius. The simple poet is in danger of acquiring vulgar habits of style and expression; the sentimental poet may remove all limits, nullify human nature, rise beyond the finite and reality and become a dreamer; freed from all law, he loses himself in fantasy; he may exaggerate and become extravagant.

¹ Ibid. s. 487.

² Letters May 26, June 21, Aug 28; May 9, Sept. 4.

³ Werke—Schiller—(15) s. 493.

⁴ Letter June 21.

⁵ Werke—Schiller s. 527.

The simple poet must not sink too low, nor the sentimental poet dream too high. Harmony must prevail and a union of simple and sentimental will attain a "beautiful humanity" as beauty results from the harmony of spirit and sense. The consummation of humanity is where the "*Spieltrieb*" raises man to perfection from physical to moral freedom, and where the naïve poet uses sentimental material in his art.

The struggle of the artist to unite the real with the ideal forms the basis of all the philosophy of Romanticism, with Friedrich Schlegel as the founder.

III. SCHLEGEL'S "IRONIE."

1. *Influence of Schiller.*

In Friedrich Schlegel is found a synthesis of Fichte, Goethe and Schiller. The dualism of Kant, his noumenon and phenomenon, and that of Fichte, the Ego and Non-ego, formed a problem for Schlegel. Schiller had attempted to combine permanence and becoming, duty and sense by means of the "*Spieltrieb*," making "play" the mediator between the spiritual and sensuous sides of man; thus it is that man only plays in art and that the poet is the true man.

Schiller's contrast between naïve and sentimental poetry was accepted by Schlegel, but in "*Die Griechen und Römer*" he renames and remodels the distinction. As we have seen, the naïve poet is lost in his portrayal of nature; the sentimental bard evinces the search for nature, as a lost paradise, and sets forth the gulf between the real and the ideal; real art will unite; the naïve poet using sentimental material.

With Schlegel, sentimental poetry represents the "return to lost nature" (*die Rückkehr zur verlohrnen Natur*),¹ but he adds that not every expression of strife toward the infinite (*Streben nach dem Unendlichen*) is sentimental, nor is every portrayal of the absolute (*Darstellung des Absoluten*)²; the real characteristics of the sentimental poetry are, "interest in the reality of an ideal (*Interesse an der Realität des Ideals*), reflexion over the relation of the ideal and real, and the relation of the idealizing fancy of the poet upon an individual object (*die Beziehung auf ein individuelles Objekt der idealisirenden Einbildungskraft des dichtenden Subjekts*)."³

Grecian poetry begins with nature and aims to reach beauty through culture;⁴ it is pure art of the beautiful (*reine Kunst des Schönen*).⁵

¹ Prosaische Jugendschriften, ed. J. Minor, Bd. I., s. 80.

² Ibid. s. 81.

³ Ibid. s. 82.

⁴ Ibid. s. 10.

⁵ Ibid. s. 38.

With modern poetry, beauty is not the ideal; it begins with interest, or subjective æsthetical power (*das Interesse, d. h. subjektive æsthetische Kraft*)¹ and its goal either has not been attained, or else it has no set aim, no direction, no unity.

Satisfaction can only arise from complete enjoyment, when all longing has ceased; modern poetry expresses unsatisfied longing; the moderns set aside beauty as an ideal and yet exhibit all the longing and dissatisfaction in striving for it after all; "*Je mehr man sich von dem Schönen entfernte, je heftiger man nach demselben strebte.*"² The limits of knowledge and art are confused and philosophy becomes poetry, and poetry philosophy. (*Die Philosophie poetisirt und die Poesie philosophirt.*)³ Schlegel denies the distinction between poetry and philosophy and requires everyone to be a true philosopher, i. e., a poet. Poetry demands absolute originality (*absolute Originalität*) and the genius arises, making a disregard of law the first principle of his art; his poetry based on the interest of the Ego (*interessante Individualität*) results in confusion (*Verwirrung*), lawlessness (*Gesetzlosigkeit*), scepticism (*Skeptizismus*), and want of principle (*Characterlosigkeit*).⁴

Each genius strives after his own ideal with unsatisfied yearning (*strebt in unbefriedigter Sehnsucht*); this disregard of law and lack of uniformity in the ideal causes modern poetry to appear as "a sea of striving forces (*Meer streitender Kräfte*), a chaos of beauty (*ein Chaos alles Erhabnen, Schönen, Reizenden*), an anarchy."⁵ Will such an anarchy bring about a beneficial revolution?

Modern poetry is spurred on by the free act (*freier Aktes des Gemüths*); it is "a restless unsatisfied striving after the new, the piquant and the striking (*das rastlose unersättliche Streben nach dem Neuen, Piquanten und Frappanten*)," but the yearning remains unsatisfied (*die Sehnsucht bleibt unbefriedigt*)⁶ Either freedom or nature gives man the impulse for culture; in modern art, it is the "free play without a set goal" (*freies Spiel ohne bestimmten Zweck*); the fantasy of the Romantic School proves this.

Schlegel mentions three classes of poets, whose goal may be the good (*das Gute*), the beautiful (*das Schöne*), or the true (*das Wahre*),⁷ but for him the ideal poetry is that which has for its goal the philosophical interest (*das philosophisch Interessante*). Accordingly he places Shakespeare as the foremost of all modern poets, whereas Schiller had placed him, as we have seen, among the naïve

1 Ibid. s. 79.

2 Ibid. s. 89.

3 Ibid. s. 89.

4 Ibid. s. 91.

5 Ibid. s. 92.

6 Ibid. s. 95.

7 Ibid. s. 103.

or simple poets;¹ he portrays for Schlegel romantic fantasy and heroic greatness mingled with poetical philosophy.

In modern poetry, the highest aim is the greatest which can be demanded of art, toward which she can strive. This unconditioned goal can never be entirely reached and the genius will be ever creating a new goal through the endless play of his fancy; it can be approached but never reached. Modern poetry will be ever changing; as the goal is changeable, so the poetry will change. With a fixed objective unchangeable goal, æsthetical culture can itself be fixed, but the subjective changeable goal set by the genius will not allow of a permanent style in poetry.

In this "æsthetical revolution," two postulates are formulated; æsthetical strength and morality. Man postulates through his freedom the moral laws. As he wills the æsthetical, so he wills the moral; then, as both arise from himself, he will persist in their furtherance. A proper taste can only arise from a morally good mind.² This reminds us of the Fichtean moral will.

With the Greeks, beauty was the all; nature surrounded the Greek poet completely; he is sunk in nature. Grecian art shows a tendency toward the objective; it is classic as Grecian plastic; "the complete harmony of poetic art and nature poetry is found only in the classic poetry" (*die vollkommene Harmonie der Kunstpoesie und Naturpoesie findet sich nur in den Alten, in der klassischen Poesie*).³ As all are sons of nature, fate (*Schicksal*) plays a great part in Greek poetry and drama. Beauty is a gift from nature and to the ideal of "free beauty," the Grecian poetry attained; "a golden age, enjoyment complete and self-satisfying (*Genuss vollständig und selbstgenugsam*), highest beauty."⁴ "Greek culture was original and national, a complete whole (*ein in sich vollendetes Ganzes*), which through pure inner development attained a high place and then again sank into itself after a complete cycle (*Kreislauf*); so original was also Greek poetry."⁵ It is a natural history of taste and art, containing the simple and pure elements into which modern poetry must be analyzed in order to unravel the chaos.⁶ Morality has no place in Grecian poetry, but patriotism attains a prominent position.

Greek poetry starts with nature and ends there; it was fostered through worldliness (*Sinnlichkeit*) and finally sank into lowest debauchery (*Schwelgerei*), into the deepest degeneracy (*Entartung*).⁷ With

1 Ibid. s. 107.

2 S. 122.

3 Athenæum § 252.

4 Die Gr. und R., s. 133.

5 S. 143.

6 S. 146.

7 S. 151.

the Romans, life also was the full enjoyment of nature, lawless and unlimited, and it finally ended in complete dissolution (*Erschlaffung und Auflösung*).¹

Modern poetry sets forth the strife of subjective disposition and objective tendency of æsthetical power, and the predominance of the latter (*den steten Streit der subjektiven Anlage und der objektiven Tendenz des æsthetischen Vermögens und das allmähliche Uebergewicht des letztern*).² The understanding is constantly striving between two opposites; from within, the eternal directions of the striving mind (*die ewigen Richtungen des strebenden Gemüths*); from without, the unalterable laws of nature (*die unwandelbaren Gesetze der Natur*).³ With the Greek, art started with nature and ended there; the modern strives to find nature again. Many German authors show a desire to unite the ancient with the modern such as the chorus (*Tendenz zum Chor*) in Schiller.⁴

Schlegel places Goethe's poetry as the "dawn of real art and pure beauty" (*die Morgenröthe echter Kunst und reiner Schönheit*);⁵ a union of ancient and modern, between the "interesting and the beautiful" (*Interessanten und die Schönen*).⁶ In "Faust," the hero's marriage with Helena of Troy is evidence of attempt to unite ancient with modern, a pursuit of the beautiful, a reconciliation of Greek ideals with northern art, but Helena vanishes and Faust awakes to practical life; also, the awful face of the Earth spirit (*schreckliches Gesicht des Erdgeistes*), like the large face of Jupiter, is a return to Greek life.⁷ Schlegel says Goethe's style is a mixture of that of Homer, Euripides and Aristophanes, of pure and simple æsthetical elements.⁸

Life to the modern is an earnest strife (*ein ernster Kampf*) seeking satisfaction. Man must be free and he forms from himself taste and enjoyment in the beautiful (*Geschmack, Genuss des Schönen*). Love is the delight of the free man, and the highest love is the love of country. (*Liebe ist der Genuss des freien Menschen und die höchste Liebe ist die Vaterlandsiebe*).⁹ This reminds one of the patriotism of the Greek and Roman. "All love is in itself poor and its fullness is a gift of nature; pure nature is all abundance; all harmony is a gift of love. In art fullness and harmony unite. Both infinites (*Unendlichkeiten*) form a new whole. Nature gives to taste extension; to love, power; to art, order and law. (*Natur gibt dem Geschmack Umfang, die Liebe Kraft, die Kunst Ordnung und Gesetz*).¹⁰

1 s. 25 (Die Grenzen des Schönen)—
Minor I.

2 s. 171.

3 s. 21.

4 s. 177.

5 s. 114.

6 Hayn's Rom. Schule, s. 189.

7 Goethe's Faust—Thomas ed.—Pt. I., 1
483.

8 Die Gr. und Römer—s. 146.

9 s. 23 und 25. (Grenzen des Schönen.)

10 s. 27.

Schiller made naïve and sentimental poetry a distinction not of time, but of manner; with Schlegel, it is a difference in the action, and therefore historical (*in der That, ein historischer*).¹ He sees the objective is the true goal of the ancient and that the only remedy for the modern is to cease being sentimental, whereby he is ruled by individual interest, and return to the classic style, that he may become Grecian again. "Schiller's standpoint," says Haym, "was ideological; Schlegel's was doctrinal."²

In the "Athenæum" the contrast is expressed in similar fashion. Schlegel says of the Greeks and Romans that they had little genius, but much ingenuity; but antiquity itself was a kind of genius which for the modern is unattainable.³ A similar distinction is made in the "Lyceum," where he asserts that "out of that which the moderns wish, one must learn what poetry should be; out of that which the ancients did, what it must be."⁴ The same work points out how the ancients were masters of poetical abstraction, while the moderns are more given to poetical speculation;⁵ among the ancients, he further declares, one sees the very letter of poetry itself, while the modern has simply an idea of the poetical spirit.⁶ With his philosophical conception of poetry, Schlegel urges that all poetry is but a commentary upon the texts of speculation and in the same manner he endeavors to unite art and science by saying "all art should become science and all science, art."⁷ By such means, Schlegel hopes to bring about a unity of poetry and philosophy; "*Zur Harmonie gelangt sie nur durch Verbindung der Poesie und der Philosophie*."⁸

The ancient with Schlegel is like the naïve of Schiller,—a poet lost in nature and thus satisfied; the modern like the sentimental seeks for a new object; with endless play, the genius has no limits; he soars above nature, setting his own goal, which he again destroys and creates anew. Perfect art would unite the ancient and modern; would unite poetry and philosophy. Can such art be realized?

We have now completed the survey of the essay "Die Griechen und Römer," which sets forth the poetical influence of Schiller on Friedrich Schlegel. Thus it is seen that ancient art, like naïve, is calm and content, but modern, like the sentimental, evinces the struggle to attain a goal, which the genius creates and then destroys.

2. Influence of Fichte and Goethe.

We will now examine the influence of Fichte on Schlegel. Fichte,

¹ Haym's Rom. Schule, s. 205.

² Romantische Schule, s. 205.

³ Athenæum § 248.

⁴ Lyceum § 84.

⁵ Lyceum § 107.

⁶ Lyceum § 93.

⁷ Lyceum § 115.

⁸ Athenæum § 451.

in his "Theory of Morals," likens philosophy to poetic talent. "Art makes the transcendental view the common one, and æsthetic contemplation finds in everything, even in the moral law, not an absolute command but itself, and hence it is related to moral law as a *free being*, not as a *slave*."¹

Schlegel declares Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" to be a philosophy of the material of Kant's philosophy (*eine Philosophie über die Materie der Kantischen Philosophie*). One can comprehend the identity of his philosophy with the Kantian (*man kann die Identität seiner Philosophie mit der Kantischen sehen und begreifen*).² Fichte believed reason and freedom should rule the state; in the world, all was the expression of freedom, the rule of the individual (*Ausdruck der Freiheit, die Alleinherrschaft des Ich*),³ and his ethical philosophy was the result of his politics.

Schlegel agreed with the theory of the power of the Ego's activity, but put an æsthetical aspect over the Fichtean ethics. Fichte's unending activity surpasses self-imposed barriers; Schlegel's activity is the fancy of the genius directed toward a self-imposed ideal, far beyond reality. He is powerfully influenced by Fichte, especially as he finds the modern Fichte to be as ethical as Plato and the ancients by whom his ethical ideals has been aroused. Two impulses strove in Schlegel's spirit for union; one the calm contented beauty and harmony of the ancient classics; the other, the subjectivism of the modern philosophy with its freedom and its strife toward the unending. (*Die befriedigte Schönheit und Harmonie in der Alterthum und der Klassiker; der Subjektivismus der modernen Philosophie mit ihrer Freiheitsbegeisterung und ihrem Streben nach dem Unendlichen*).⁴ How can he reconcile them?

Goethe in his poetry portrays the beautiful and harmonious (*das Schöne und Harmonische*); Fichte, the striving ego (*Weltbekämpfenden Ich*).⁵ Schlegel, in his æsthetical and ethical doctrine unites Goethe and Fichte; he places the "Wissenschaftslehre," "Wilhelm Meister" with the French Revolution, as the three greatest tendencies of the age,⁶ and again the Fichtean idealism and Goethe's poetry are the two centers of German art and culture (*die beiden Centra der deutschen Kunst und Bildung*).⁷

In his essay, "Über die Poesie," Schlegel speaks of three characteristics of "Wilhelm Meister," whereby we learn of Goethe's influence on Schlegel. The characteristics are first, individuality (*Individu-*

¹ Cf. Erdmann Vol. II., § 314; 3.

² Athenæum § 281.

³ Haym s. 218.

⁴ Haym s. 249.

⁵ Haym s. 249.

⁶ Athenæum § 216.

⁷ U. die Unverständlichkeit—Minor Bd. 11., s. 389.

alität), second, antique spirit under a modern veil (*antike Geist unter der modernen Hülle*), and third, a harmony of classic and romantic (*Harmonie des Classischen und des Romantischen*). The author expresses two ideas; that of a romance (*Künstler-roman*), and the education of a life (*Bildungslehre der Lebenskunst*).¹ As stated above, Goethe unites the antique style with the "Ironie" of reflection, the ancient and the modern. The Romantic element of mystery is accorded by Mignon and the Harper, whose lyrics both entertain and give food for reflection. Schlegel declares the book to be "an historical philosophy of art" (*eine historische Philosophie der Kunst*), "a work of art, or poem" (*ein Kunstwerk oder Gedicht*), "all poetry, pure poetry" (*alles Poesie, reine, hohe Poesie. . . .*), "this wonderful prose is prose and yet poetry. The book has genius" (*diese wunderbare Prosa ist Prosa und doch Poesie. Das Buch hat Genius*).²

Throughout the book is seen the "Ironie," which we learn now is a contrast between hope and result (*Hoffnung und Erfolg*), fancy and reality (*Einbildung und Wirklichkeit*), reality and idealism (*Realität und Idealität*).³ Wilhelm's unending impulse for culture is another phase of "Ironie." The book seems a play, but it soon becomes seriousness (*Es ist ein interessantes Spiel und wurde nun Ernst*).⁴ The Romantic personae Mignon, Sperata and Augustine all pass away on account of the excess (*Uebermass*) of their own soaring fancies. Schlegel considers Goethe to have reached the goal in art. "He who has properly characterized Goethe's Meister has truly said what the poetry of the age is." (*Wer Goethe's Meister gehörig charakterisirte, der hätte damit wohl eigentlich gesagt, was es jetzt an der Zeit ist in der Poesie*).⁵ Schlegel calls "Wilhelm Meister" the genuine romance, the sum of everything poetical, and he designates this poetical ideal, the "Romantic poetry" (*romantische Dichtung*).⁶ Here he changes the term modern to "Romantic" and lays stress on the fact that it does not lack "Die Ironie."

The ancient classic art expressed complete harmony and satisfaction; the modern, or under its new term, Romantic, art expresses strife. "*Die romantische Dichtung ist eine progressive Universalpoesie* (is a progressive universal poetry) . . . a union of poetry and philosophy . . . it is unending, because it alone is free and posits as its first law that the poet will suffer no law over him (*es ist unendlich, weil sie allein frei ist und das als ihr erstes Gesetz*

¹ Ueber die Poesie—Minor II., s. 381.

² Ueber W. Meister—Ch. und Kr. Minor II s. 171.

³ Ibid s. 174.

⁴ Ibid s. 182.

⁵ Lyceum Minor II. § 120.

⁶ Haym s. 251.

anerkennt, dass die Willkühr des Dichters kein Gesetz über sich leide.¹

We see here the Fichtean influence of freedom and the Goethean expression of egoism. This is Schlegel's "*Ironie*," the watchword of Romanticism, as Novalis says "*Die Spadille, womit immer gestochen würde.*"²

4. "DIE IRONIE."

The concept of "*Ironie*" involves a gradual growth as did Romantic poetry itself. The first use of "*Ironie*" with Schlegel was a mention of the "Socratic irony; all jest and earnestness; it springs from the union of natural philosophy and philosophy of art" (*die Sokratische Ironie, alles Scherz und Ernst; sie entspringt aus dem Zusammen-treffen vollendeter Naturphilosophie und vollendeter Kunstphilosophie*)³ . . . *die Urbanität der Sokratischen Muse.*⁴ He then gives voice to a new "*Ironie*," a "*Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten* . . . *sie ist die freieste aller Lizenzen. . . . sie ist Selbstparodie* (a strife of unconditioned and conditioned . . . it is the freest of all licenses . . . it is a parody of Self).⁵

"*Ironie*" expresses the problematic dualisms of Kant and Fichte, the freedom of the Fichtean Ego and the individuality of Goethe's hero.

Schlegel further characterizes "*Ironie*" as finding its true home in philosophy, and as the means of raising poetry to the heights of philosophy, and uniting them. He asserts that there are many poems, both old and new, that breathe the air of "*Ironie*."⁶ "*Ironie*" is much in evidence in "*Wilhelm Meister*;" the author seems to laugh at his own masterpiece from a position far above it.⁷

This is not the "Socratic irony;" it is a transcendental buffoonery; within, a spirit which oversees all and ever elevates itself over all conditioned (*im Innern, die Stimmung welche alles übersieht, und sich über alles Bedingte unendlich erhebt*); without, in expression, the mimical manner of a clown (*im Äussern, in der Ausführung die mimische Manier eines guten Buffo*).⁸

Two characteristics of "*Ironie*" are evident; first, strife, of an unavoidable incongruity (*Widerstreit, unvermeidlicher Unangemessenheit*) and second, the triumphant elevation of the subject into

1 Athenæum § 116 (Minor II).

2 Ch. Haym s. 258.

3 Lyceum § 108.

4 Lyceum § 42.

5 Lyceum § 108.

6 Lyceum § 42.

7 Ueber W. Meister—(Minor II) s. 171.

8 Lyceum § 42.

unconditional freedom (*die triumphirende Erhebung in die unbedingte Freiheit des Subjekts*).¹ The first seems to remind us of the Socratic, while the second is a recasting of the concept.

In the Fichtean Ego's activity can be united these two ideas; the strife of the Ego and its freedom and limitation in the ethical world order. It is an endless strife, never attaining realization. The "Ironie" contains the same doctrine, the strife of the real and ideal in art and poetry is never to be adjusted. The Ego can never reach the ideal it posits in its æsthetical freedom.

Such a doctrine aroused what Schlegel called the "*Unverständlichkeit*" (unintelligibility) and he writes a "Fragment" to lighten the difficulty. He gives a system of "Die Ironie" in which he describes various sorts of "Ironie;" "*die grobe, die delikate und die extra-feine Ironie*" (coarse, delicate and extra fine), all used by writers in expressing feigned friendliness waiting for an opportunity to injure; fourth, "*die redliche Ironie*;" then, "*die dramatische Ironie*," where the dramatist plans for three acts, and then finds he must add two more; "*die doppelte Ironie*," one for *Parterre*, the other for *die Logen*; lastly "*Die Ironie der Ironie*" and this is the most profound (*gründlichste*) "Ironie of Ironie."² This "Ironie" is "the form of the Paradox. Paradox is all that is great and at the same time good. (*Paradox ist alles was zugleich gut und gross ist.*)"³ The romances are the Socratic dialogues of our age (*Sokratischen Dialoge unserer Zeit*).⁴

The strife of real and ideal as the basis of "Ironie" may be shown in the meaning of an "*Idee*":—"Ein Ideal ist Idee. Eine Idee ist eine absolute Synthesis absoluter Antithesen, der stete sich selbst erzeugende Wechsel zwei streitender Gedanken. . . . Nichts ist kläglicher als die sentimentale speculation ohne Objekt."⁵ He furthermore brings in the idea of change in saying that "Ironie" is an everlasting change of self-creation and self-destruction,⁶ and that it is "clear knowledge of the eternal activity in the unending chaos."⁷

"Ironie" creates and then destroys both "*Idee*" and "*Projekt*." A project is the subjective germ of an object to be—it must be both subjective and objective;—the transcendental is that which has reference to the union or separation of the ideal and the real (*was auf die Verbindung oder Trennung des Idealen und Realen Bezug hat*).⁸

With the subjective element now emphasized in the Schlegelian

1 Haym s. 259.

2 Ueber die Unverständlichkeit—Minor II. s. 392.

3 Lyceum § 48.

4 Lyceum § 26.

5 Athenæum § 121.

6 Athenæum § 51.

7 Ideen § 69.

8 Athenæum § 22.

poetry and philosophy, we see a contradiction to his theory which was supreme when he wrote, "Ueber die Griechische Poesie" and prayed for a return to it. There all was objective; here all is the free unending subjectivity of the Ego; now "Ironie" rules where objectivity, or nature, had reigned then. He himself declares: "*Mein Versuch über das Studium der griechischen Poesie ist ein manierirter Hymnus in Prosa auf das Objektive in der Poesie. Das Schlechteste daran scheint mir der gänzliche Mangel der unentbehrlichen Ironie.*"¹ Here we see that Schlegel himself now judges that the "Ironie" is a necessity in poetry; we also perceive the influence of the Fichtean "Wissenschaftslehre," in changing Schlegel's doctrine to one of subjectivity.

Schiller's sentimental poetry, in satire, elegy or idyll, set forth the relation of real and ideal; Schlegel uses the word "transcendental" as noted above; it is the opposite to naïve. He writes that "*Transcendental ist was in der Höhe ist, sein soll und kann,*"² and that transcendental poetry has its entirety in the relation of real and ideal, and though it begins as satire, showing the difference of ideal and real, it soars about as elegy, and ends as an idyll with the identity of the two.³

Transcendental poetry is marked by reflexion and self-mirroring (*Selbstbespiegelung*) and will become the "poetry of poetry." Schlegel calls Dante, the prophet, Shakespeare, the centre and Goethe, the climax of transcendental poetry, the great trio of modern poetry (*der grosse Dreiklang der modernen Poesie*).⁴ In "Faust," "die Ironie" is noticed in "*Ihn treibt die Gährung in die Ferne,*"⁵ "*nicht ein Wunsch erfüllen wird,*"⁶ "*O dass dem Menschen nichts Vollkommnes wird, empfind' ich nun*";⁷ "*so taumel' ich von Begierde zu Genuss, und im Genuss verschmacht' ich nach Begierde,*"⁸ "*des Ruhms, des Namensdauer Trug.*"⁹ Already we have mentioned "die Ironie" in Meister." Schlegel places Goethe as the greatest poet; his works evincing all the characteristics of the transcendental Romantic poetry, united with a classic style of beauty and simplicity. As "die Ironie," the unending strife after the ideal, hovers over transcendental poetry, so in the transcendental philosophy of Kant, we perceive the same unending longing to attain a goal, although it was not then called "Ironie;" "We have traversed the whole domain of the understanding. This domain is an island, and enclosed by nature within limits that can never be changed. It is the country of truth, but surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the true home of illusion (*eigentlichen Sitze*

1 Lyceum § 7.

2 Athenæum § 388.

3 Athenæum § 238.

4 Athenæum § 247.

5 Faust I. l. 302.

6 l. 1557.

7 l. 3240.

8 l. 3249-50.

9 Faust I. l. 1596.

des Scheins), where many a fogbank and ice that soon melts away tempt us to believe in new lands, while constantly deceiving the adventurous mariner with vain hopes (*leere Hoffnungen*), and involving him in adventures which he can never leave, and yet can never bring to an end."¹ This, with Kant, became the unending ethical activity of Fichte and later, "*die Ironie*," the ceaseless creative fancy of the free genius of Schlegel.

Closely related to "*Ironie*" in the æsthetical doctrine of Schlegel is found wit. From the following aphorisms, wit will be seen to be subjective, arising from an excess of spirit and casting mysticism and fantasy over the poetic art: "Wit is unconditioned social spirit, or a fragmentary ingenuity;² wit is logical sociability;³ it is an "explosion" of restrained spirit;⁴ nothing is more wretched than sad wit;⁵ mild wit, or wit without a point is a privilege of poetry;⁶ a prophetic power.⁷ Witty conceits are the proverbs of cultured people;⁸ one should have wit, but should not wish to have it (*man soll Witz haben, aber nicht haben wollen*);⁹ comic wit is a mixture of epic and iambic;¹⁰ wit is the principle (*Prinzip*) and the medium of universal philosophy. Kant had critical wit;¹¹ humor is the wit of sensation;¹² real social wit is without a crack (*ohne Knall*);¹³ reason is mechanical, wit is chemical, and genius is an organic spirit;¹⁴ there is a kind of wit, that on account of its strength (*Gediegenheit*), fulness (*Ausführlichkeit*) and symmetry may be called the architectonic;¹⁵ wit is the appearance, the outward flash of fantasy (*Blitz der Fantasie*). Therefore its divinity, and the resemblance of wit to mysticism,¹⁶ fantasy and wit are everything to you—interpret the charming appearance and make seriousness out of the play (*Ernst aus dem Spiel*), so you will grasp the central point and will again find art;¹⁷ urbanity is the wit of a harmonious universality,¹⁸ one can only think of wit as written, like law; one must value its products according to their weight.¹⁹

Wit, therefore, is a play from the surplus of spirit in the Ego; it may be social, logical, comical, humorous, sad, prophetic, critical, powerful or fantastic, but it always is subjective and æsthetical and allied to "*Ironie*."

"*Die Ironie*" with Schlegel has various phases; the idealistic,

1 Krit. der reinen Vernunft—s. 295—Hartenstein s. 214.	11 Ath. 220.
2 Lyceum § 9.	12 Ath. 237.
3 Lyceum § 56.	13 Ath. 289.
4 Lyceum § 90.	14 Ath. 366.
5 Lyceum § 17.	15 Ath. 383.
6 Ly. 109.	16 Ideen 26.
7 Ly. 126.	17 Ideen 109.
8 Ath. 29.	18 Ath. 438.
9 Ath. 32.	19 Ath. 394.
10 Ath. 156.	

æsthetical, ethical, religious, logical, and pessimistic in its result although optimistic in its start. Let us examine each of these phases briefly, accompanying each statement with Schlegel's own aphorisms.

1. "Ironie" with Schlegel is subjective and idealistic; it is based upon the Ego's fancy and the self positing of a goal—"Die Individualität ist das Ursprüngliche und Ewige im Menschen; Die Bildung und Entwicklung dieser Individualität als höchsten Beruf zu treiben, wäre ein göttlicher Egoismus;"¹ again, "Die Philosophie ist eine Ellipse. Das eine Centrum ist das Selbstgesetz der Vernunft. Das andre ist die Idee des Universums;"² "Nur wer einzig ist mit der Welt kann einzig sein mit sich selbst."³ The starting point is the Ego and the Ego's inclination to strive toward an ideal.

2. "Ironie" is æsthetical; it is founded on interest. The Ego, as a genius, knows no law, but creates an ideal toward which he strives. The ideal is ever changing according to the never-ending play of the Ego's fancy. "Nicht die Kunst und die Werke machen den Künstler, sondern der Sinn und die Begeisterung und der Trieb."⁴ "Die intellektuale Anschauung ist der kategorische Imperativ der Theorie;"⁵ here we perceive the Kantian influence. In "Poetischer Schein ist Spiel der Vorstellungen, und Spiel ist Schein von Handlungen."⁶ the idea of "play" is emphasized. "Ironie" is very marked in "Was in der Poesie geschieht, geschieht nie, oder immer"⁷ and the disregard of law is evident in "Der Schein der Regellosigkeit."⁸

3. "Ironie" is ethical. As the Ego knows no law in art, so he knows no law in morals. His laws come from within and he seeks freedom in morality; this ended in vulgarity in his "Lucinde." Note the opposition to law in "Die erste Regung der Sittlichkeit ist Opposition gegen die Gesetzmäßigkeit und konventionelle Rechtlichkeit, und eine grenzenlose Reizbarkeit des Gemüths."⁹ "Man hat nur so viel Moral, als man Philosophie und Poesie hat,"¹⁰ evinces the relation of the three, as also "Athmet ein Werk die ganze Fülle der Menschheit, ist es moralisch."¹¹ "Alle Selbständigkeit ist ursprünglich, ist Originalität, und alle Originalität ist moralisch, ist Originalität des ganzen Menschen."¹² "Ironie" is ethical, following self-imposed laws, which exist for pure enjoyment.

4. "Ironie" is religious, for the Ego enjoys freedom of spirit. Religion is a product of freedom; "je freier, je religiöser; und je

1 Ideen 60.
2 Ideen 117.
3 Ideen 130.
4 Lyceum § 63.
5 Ath. § 76.
6 Ath. § 100.

7 Ath. § 101.
8 Ath. § 227.
9 Ath. § 425.
10 Ideen 62.
11 Ideen § 33.
12 Ideen § 153.

mehr Bildung, je weniger Religion."¹ *"Die Religion ist nicht blos ein Theil der Bildung, sondern das Centrum"*². *"Frei ist der Mensch, wenn er Gott hervorbringt oder sichtbar macht, und dadurch wird er unsterblich."*³ The unending ideal and eternal God are related in *"Wenn jedes unendliche Individuum Gott ist, so giebt's so viele Götter als Ideale. Das Verhältniss des wahren Künstlers und des wahren Menschen zu seinen Idealen ist durchaus Religion"*⁴ *"Wer Religion hat, wird Poesie reden."*⁵ *"Jede Beziehung der Menschen aufs Unendliche ist Religion.. Das Unendliche ist die Gottheit."*⁶ With Fichte, *"Wenn das Interesse am Uebersinnlichen das Wesen der Religion ist, so ist seine ganze Lehre Religion in Form der Philosophie."*⁷ *"Was der freie Mensch schlechthin constituirt, worauf der nicht freie Mensch alles bezieht, das ist seine Religion."*⁸ *"Ohne Poesie wird die Religion dunkel, falsch und böse; ohne Philosophie ausschweifend in aller Unzucht und wollüstig bis zur Selbstentmannung."*⁹

5. "Ironie" is logical. It sets a problem but it is not able to solve. The problem of the gulf between the real and ideal presents a riddle too difficult to be unraveled. It has to do with Sein und Nicht—sein, and its very being is "Reflexion."¹⁰

6. "Ironie" is optimistic when it lays stress on man's ability to solve the problem of the real and ideal. Soon the strife is found to be unending, the ideal to be unattainable, and "Ironie" becomes pessimism. Man fails to reach the goal his fancy has created, there is no satisfaction but only an everlasting "*Sehnsucht*" and "*Weltschmerz*."

From the above paragraphs, we find, therefore, that "Ironie" is idealistic and subjective; that it invades the realms of æsthetics, ethics, religion and logic, and that although it starts out on an optimistic basis, it soon becomes pessimistic in its inability to solve its problem of attaining an ideal.

The possession of "Ironie," or the power to create ideals makes man a genius;¹¹ he admits no limitation to his creative power, he possesses the highest virtue, and seeks free play of his own fancy. The ordinary individual sees the established limits of convention and respects these, but the transcendental poetical and original Ego, as the Fichtean Ego, sees only what he himself posits and what he may change at will; he plays with his own limits. Genius has no care, knows no law.

1 Ath. § 233.

2 Ideen § 14.

3 Ideen § 29.

4 Ath. 406.

5 Ideen 34.

6 Ideen 81.

7 Ideen 105.

8 Id. 147.

9 Id. 149.

10 Ath. § 305.

11 Cf. Erdmann Hist. of Phil., Vol. II, §314:3.

This constitutes morality, an opposition to law and custom;¹ the spiritless man fears custom, and is guilty when he breaks a law, but the person of genius is free from it. This is also religion, the highest enjoyment of one's own freedom.²

With Schiller, the genius makes his own laws; is simple and naïve in his manner, uniting perfection of art and morality. With Schopenhauer a genius is an Ego possessing excess of power and surplus of knowledge; one who has freed himself from the service of the will; Kant's genius is an intelligence that works like nature; Lombroso puts genius akin to madness and Plato expresses it as "those who come into the sunlight from a dark cave, cannot afterwards see properly."

Schlegel calls genius an "instinct for unrestricted caprice;"³ or "genius is a system of talents."⁴ In another aphorism, "not unrestricted caprice but freedom as wit, love and faith."⁵ "Some have genius for truth; many have genius for going astray;"⁶ "genius is an organic spirit;"⁷ "every complete person has genius. True virtue is inventive genius."⁸

As stated above, the genius knows no law and morality for him constitutes opposition to all law.

In his "Lucinde," Schlegel attempts to show contempt for all rules and laws which may repress man's freedom. Fichte's Ego with its self-contemplation lends itself as foundation for the novel. He accepts Goethe's "Meister" as a typical novel and attempts to produce a similar one. Beginning with an "allegory on boldness" (*Allegorie von der Frechheit*), in which he contemplates the novels he will undertake in future, he promises wit and fantasy, which are the chief characteristics of poetry.

The story, copying "Meister," as it does, deals with the life of a youth, Julius. This Julius, an artist, roams about seeking satisfaction. Nothing interested him except while untried. He lives a life of sensuous enjoyment, but in the moment of greatest passion, would analyze his feelings with unfeeling coldness. Finally, he meets "Lucinde," who like himself feels contempt for the world's proprieties. "She lived in a world of her own building and creating (*selbstgedachten und selbstgebildeten*) . . . she had broken all bonds and all deference (*Rücksichten*) and lived free and independent (*frei und unabhängig*)."⁹ Julius now feels a life of happiness dawn before him; he has found a new feeling which he may study. They live in

¹ Athenæum 425.

² Athenæum 406.

³ Char. und Kr. s. 170 (Minor II)

⁴ Ath. § 119.

⁵ Lyceum § 16.

⁶ Ath. § 265.

⁷ Ath. § 366.

⁸ Ideen § 36.

⁹ Lucinde (Universal-Bibliothek-Reclam.)—s. 61.

supreme bliss and love. "Love is not only the quiet longing for the unending; it is also the holy enjoyment of a beautiful present (*Genuss einer schönen Gegenwart*). It is the complete unity of mortal and immortal (*Sterblichen und Unsterblichen*).¹

"Lucinde" is an expression of Schlegel's theory of æsthetical freedom, but here it enters the realm of morality. Freedom of the Ego is the basis of the romance; opposition against form and order, against law and custom is the spirit of the work. It raises the ironical free will and egotistic self-enjoyment to a high plane.

As the man of genius is above law, so real morality consists in defiance of any existing code. Actions will be called immoral by those, who are not in the same class with the genius.

"Lucinde" is a war against the conventional. It is Romantic freedom of the Ego applied to society. Marriage for the man of genius is not a sacred institution. He, therefore, disregards it and is capable of true love, existing in a natural marriage. We have here the highest form of happiness derived from absolute freedom, in gratification of the spiritual (above custom), and the sensuous side of the Ego.

This also is religion; "For what God can be worthy of honor to the man who would not be his own God (*welcher Gott kann dem Menschen ehrwürdig sein, der nicht sein eigener Gott ist*)?"²

In the following he sets forth his opposition to limitations; "Friendship is partial marriage and love is friendship on all sides and universal friendship in all directions. Knowledge of the necessary limits is the most indispensable and the most rare in friendship."³ Again in "What one calls a happy marriage, relates itself to love, as a correct poem does to an improvised song"⁴ and "Almost all marriages are only concubinages,"⁵ he shows contempt for legal marriage.

"Lucinde" was an attempt to gain freedom in morality as had been done in poetry, religion and philosophy. Great emphasis was laid on the Ego and the Ego's creative fancy, which is "die Ironie." This freedom Schlegel admits into all departments of culture and life.

5. Contrast of Socratic, Christian and modern irony.

We have learned that with Schlegel "Ironie" means the painful sense which predominates when the individual cannot pass from the reality to the ideal. The Ego is ever creating by means of his fancy unattainable goals, and, when not gained, gloom and despair follow.

¹ Ibid. s. 69.

² Lucinde s. 30. Cf. Nathan der Weise s. 56. (Univ. Bibliothek.)

³ Athenæum 359.

⁴ Ath. 268.

⁵ Ath. 34.

With Socrates, we find an irony which is rhetorical rather than metaphysical. His was an artistic and humorous play by which he led his opponents on in argument until, by a clever question, he turned their own arguments against themselves. This irony was optimistic and self-contained; he feigned ignorance for the purpose of snaring his antagonist. His "accustomed irony" was humorous and subtle; he humbled himself, putting the opposing opinions in the foreground, until these fall to the ground after his humble questioning. He knew human nature and as a master of irony brought out the inconsistencies of human nature. The reader of the Platonic dialogues can scarcely distinguish between the real and the assumed wisdom of Socrates. The irony prevents it. In the "Theætetus," he plays both parts, charging his own arguments with unfairness and arrives at no conclusion.¹ In the Philebus, he says, "I cannot tell you, rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers."² The triumphs of this irony consist in the overthrow of false ideas through clear demonstration of the truth.

Schlegel's "Ironie" was not humorous or artistic; on the contrary, it was very practical, resulting in *Weltschmerz* and pessimism as the longing and strivings could never be realized. As Rückert says:

*"Vor jedem steht ein Bild des, das er werden soll;
So lang er das nicht ist, ist nicht sein Friede voll."*

Renan calls Christ "*Le grand maitre en ironie*." This irony of Christianity arises from discontent with the world and life and a desire for an ideal existence in another realm. Schlegel's "Ironie" creates images which must come to naught; Novalis creates a world which is a "dream;" Christian irony consists in the disappointment resulting from the comparison of the reality of this world and the ideals created by the spirit. The Christian religion is founded upon pain and evil; the Christian makes ideals and suffers because he cannot realize these. Human life cannot attain to the spiritual, and so despair succeeds. This is the "Ironie." The Christian must negate the world and find God and this is where the struggle comes.

Christ is like Socrates in the irony on a few occasions: He knew the Gospel was the universal one, but He talks as one believing in local gods when He converses with the woman of Samaria in St. John IV: 20, 21, 24, and again when talking to the Syro-phenician woman in St. Mark VII: 28. In the rest of His teaching, Christ's irony is

¹ Theætetus (for Protagoras 166-168); vs. doctrine 183E.

² Philebus (Jowett's trans.)—25.

like that of Schlegel, a painful life founded on evil and suffering, and a struggle to realize an ideal.

Modern "Ironie," as said above, is the strife between reality and the ideal which Schiller brought forth in his "*Spieltrieb*" in art, and which was followed by Schlegel in the "Ironie," by Novalis as a *Traum*, and finally by Schopenhauer in irrational pessimism.

As Goethe in "Werther" says, "But alas! when we have attained our object, when the distant *there* becomes the present *here*, all is changed again; we are as poor and circumscribed as ever and our souls still languish for unattainable happiness."¹

Many were influenced and affected by the "Ironie," and tried to solve the problem by art, philosophy, religion or morality, but the ideal is not yet attained and the *Weltschmerz* still abides.

6. Schlegel's Influence.

A.

The influence of Schlegel's "Ironie" is felt in the realm of philosophy, literature and religion. Among the philosophers we will briefly examine Novalis, Schelling and Solger.

Schlegel says of Friedrich von Hardenberg, or Novalis, that "*Nicht auf der Gränze schwebst du, sondern in deinem Geiste haben sich Poesie und Philosophie innig durchdrungen.*"² Schlegel's conception of the Ego creating a world, which after all is only ideal, is accepted by Novalis; for him, the world is merely the dreamy creation of the fancy; "*Die Welt wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt.*"³ He is the "Prophet of Romanticism," and assigns to poetry the task of solving the problem of life. To the ideals of Romanticism, he gave expression in "Heinrich von Ofterdingen;" this was in opposition to "Wilhelm Meister," which he considered prosaic, with its industrialism and commercial affairs, a growth away from the artistic. "Heinrich" is a nature allegory, setting forth the poetry in life; it is full of Romantic longing, the search for an ideal. Here it is happiness which will be attained when Heinrich finds the "Blue Flower."⁴ The first part is called Expectancy (*Die Erwartung*) and the second, Fulfillment (*Die Erfüllung*); the latter was left unfinished. The search of Heinrich is in vain, and even in his dreams, when the flower seems near, in a moment it is gone. He cannot gain the longed-for happiness. It is an endless search, a nameless longing, all dreamy *Zauberei*, a play of his imagination.

¹ Bohn Lib. ed.—Werther—p. 267 (letter June 21).

² Ideen—An Novalis—s. 307 (Minor).

³ Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1815) I s. 219.

⁴ Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1815) I s. 9.

The "Blue Flower" is symbolic of the Romantic School and typifies the longings of a poet's soul.

In Novalis, we discover the influence of Kant's "free beauty" and Schiller's "free play," of Fichte's individualistic idealism, of Goethe's egoism but an opposition to his utilitarianism, and lastly, of Schlegel's concept of "Ironie" (*Liebingsbegriff der Ironie*).¹

With Schlegel, "Ironie" is the wavering freedom of the Ego, Novalis applies the fantastic freedom to the world; Schlegel's is the freedom of the reason, Novalis' is the freedom of the spirit (*Gemüths*): it makes the world, a myth, a fantasy, only a product of the imagination.²

Novalis' writings have been characterized as mystical subjectivism, magical idealism and musical phantasy;³ they are laden with moral and religious sentiments but over all is felt the phantasy of nature. Nature, however, is only the product of the Ego, only a "Traumbild," a dream-world⁴ and we are only despairing players.⁵ "*Die Welt ist Resultat eines unendlichen Einverständnisses, und unsre eigne innere Pluralität ist der Grund der Weltanschauung.*"⁶

He calls philosophy a longing, "*eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb überall zu Hause zu sein.*"⁷ In his "Fragmente" he speculates on all possible truths, such as "*Goethe ist der wahre Statthalter des poetischen Geistes auf Erden,*"⁸ "*Des Dichters Reich sei die Welt,*"⁹ "*die Blumenwelt ist eine unendliche Ferne,*"¹⁰ "*die Individualität in der Natur ist unendlich,*"¹¹ "*die individuelle Seele soll mit der Weltseele übereinstimmend werden,*"¹² "*die Phantasie ist der stoff des Verstandes,*"¹³ "*Philosophie ist die freie eingebildete Kunst,*"¹⁴ "*der Traum ist bedeutend und prophetisch, weil er eine Naturseelenwirkung ist, wie Poesie; durchaus frei,*"¹⁵ "*wir sind in und ausser der Natur,*"¹⁶ "*Der Liebe gehts wie die Philosophie, sie ist also das Ich—das Ideal jeder Bestrebung,*"¹⁷ "*Kann ein Ich sich als Ich setzen, ohne ein anderes Ich oder nicht-Ich?*"¹⁸

As Schlegel was dependent on the Fichtean Ego, so also was Novalis. His philosophy and morality are interchangeable; at the base of all is the Ego and his will, but the power of nature is over him. He knows no law, and uses nature as symbolic of his poetical inspirations. "The barrier (*Scheidewand*) between fable and truth,

1 Haym s. 379.

2 Haym s. 380.

3 Haym s. 377, 378.

4 Novalis Sch. (Berlin 1846) III s. 155.

5 Novalis Sch. s. 157.

6 Novalis Sch. (Ber. 1815) II s. 152.

7 Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1815) II s.

118. 8 Novalis Schriften (Berlin 1846) III. s.

164.

9 s. 186.

10 s. 192.

11 s. 197.

12 s. 203.

13 s. 224.

14 s. 275.

15 s. 293.

16 s. 309.

17 s. 316.

18 s. 320.

between past and present is cast down; faith, fantasy, and poetry disclose the inmost world,"¹ and this world is only a "*Zauberstadt*," a dream.

With Schelling, in his æsthetics, we find again the opposition between reality and ideal, causing a struggling in the artist's soul. The ancients felt no opposition and there is no indication of a strife in their art and sculpture; the "Venus of Milo" is calm and complacent; the face is beautiful, but it lacks expression. The modern artist feels the relation between the finite appearance and his ideal.

Schelling speaks of an unconscious will, creating these ideas, which are more "divinely beautiful in his vision than upon his canvas." Modern art sets forth the struggle of the soul, and its suffering. The modern feels his inability to produce his ideal; all is dark striving.

Schelling carries the same idea into philosophy; his was a nature philosophy, and he regards nature and spirit as two aspects of the "world-soul;" Nature is the visible spirit, the spirit is invisible nature for him. His philosophy led to mysticism. His chief service in Romanticism was in his æsthetics, and there nature and spirit were to be identified, were to be blended in art; art was to harmonize all contradictions when it reached perfection; the unconscious-conscious activity of the genius will abolish all antitheses. "Art is the true organon of philosophy; science and philosophy are one-sided, and never completely develop the subjective reason; art is complete as entirely realized reason."²

Schelling's doctrine again caused the Neo-Platonic conception of beauty, as phenomenal manifestation of the Idea in the sensuous, to be recognized. The relation between finite and infinite agreed with Schlegel's principle of irony and Solger made this the basis of his theory of art; art is the artist's strife for his ideal.

B.

In the realm of literature, we may take Tieck and Wackenroder as exponents of Schlegel's influence. As mentioned above, Tieck added the phase of picturesque mystery to the Romantic movement. His earlier works were wild and horrible, but finally he finds his true self in the world of legend (*Märchenwelt*). His love songs and nature mysteries are attempts to explain his emotion, his fleeting feelings; he revels in the supernatural, in allegories on Nature; he talks

¹ Tieck's Nachwort zum Ofterdingen (Novalis Sch. 1815) I. 258.

² Windelband—Hist. of Phil. p. 607.

of moonlight, of magic, makes the bugle the instrument of Romanticism, and envelops the reader in a Romantic haze by his imagery.

The bewilderment aroused by the real and ideal ended in the free play of the fantastic, of the lyrical-musical and the legends,¹ as it had ended in the poetical "dream" of Novalis. The legend lies between reason and mystery. Wackenroder's love for the beautiful aroused his earnestness for a life of art; for him art is holy and divine; it is a religion. His conception of art was opposed to the classical ideals of Goethe and Schiller, and the art of Lessing. His was the love of the mediæval art, the Madonnas of Raphael and Holbein, the art of Dürer; he gave the impetus to the Madonna-worship, which caused many of the Romanticists to become Roman Catholic; we find Novalis inditing a verse in "Ich sehe dich in tausend Bildern, Maria, lieblich ausgedrückt u. s. w."²

Wackenroder however loved music even more; "music is the land of faith, where all our doubts and sufferings are lost in a tuneful sea."³ Tieck agrees with him, because music came before written or spoken language; poetry appeals more by its music than its meaning and love needs no words, as:

"Liebe denkt in süßen Tönen,
Denn Gedanken steh'n zu fern,
Nur in Tönen mag sie gern
Alles, was sie will, verschönen."⁴

Tones are the language of the soul striving to express its inmost feelings.

The Schlegelian influence causes Novalis to move in a dream world of fantasy; Tieck to find relief in the legend world of mystery and Wackenroder to live in the art of mediævalism and the world of tone.

C.

In the realm of religion, Friedrich Schleiermacher may be taken as one influenced by Romanticism. Throughout his "Discourses on Religion," he makes frequent reference to the importance of the individual, as did Kant and Fichte, and also to the ceaseless activity of the universe, which is ever revealing itself to us. The opposing activities found in the other Romantics are also voiced by him. Every definite thing, according to Schleiermacher, is made up of

¹ Haym s. 350.

² Novalis Schriften (1815) II. 42.

³ Tieck-Phantasien ü die Kunst s. 150.

⁴ Phantasien über die Kunst—(1799) s. 246.

two opposite activities. Each life is a manifestation of gain and loss. The spirit and the human soul are created by two great impulses; by the one impulse, the soul strives to establish itself as an individual; by the other, it longs to surrender itself to the whole, to be absorbed, fearing to stand alone.¹ Those in whom one impulse alone exists are not living in the nature of humanity. This longing to be one with the whole, the striving to unite the individual with the living World-spirit is the ideal of religion. The pious man can see the operation of the World-spirit in all that belongs to human activity.² He understands, through contemplation, that the individual is one form of humanity, and that humanity is one form of the unity of spirit and matter.

But above this, is the feeling of some higher, closer union of the two, a feeling which cannot be described. The striving individual, "the fruit of opposing views" stands contrasted with the quiet, uniform whole.³ He longs to be united with it, and this is attained through feeling, a living contact with the world. "In man is an insatiable longing for ever stricter purification, ever richer fulness. . . . What do you call that feeling of unsatisfied longing which is directed toward a great object? . . . With Christians this holy sadness is the dominant tone of all their religious feelings."⁴ Personality must be "annihilated" and we, lost in the Infinite, become one with it.⁵ "Whosoever loses his life for my sake, shall find it."⁶ The impulse to establish individuality must be lost by union with the whole, by which the individual is absorbed. The strife will then be over. This is the nature of true religion, the ideal religion of Schleiermacher, when we reach a sense and taste for, and a feeling of absolute dependence on the Infinite.

The "Ironie" of Schlegel will be overcome when religion becomes ideal and the striving ceases. Schleiermacher speaks of "play" also. He declares that all imaginative natures have some stirrings of piety; also that they fail in mastering the essential, as "a light, changing play of beautiful, charming but merely fortuitous and subjective combinations satisfies them."⁷ In his tribute to Novalis, he says that "his whole contemplation was a poem; and that when artists become pious the great resurrection shall be celebrated."⁸ He indicates that art may be an aid to the attainment of the ideal religion and that play of the imagination may be important, after all.

1 On Religion—trans. by John Oman, p.

3, 4.

2 Ibid p. 84.

3 Ibid. p. 81.

4 Ibid. p. 245.

5 Ibid. p. 137.

6 St. Mark VIII, 35.

7 On Religion p. 133.

8 On Religion p. 41.

Schleiermacher was powerfully under the influence of the Romanticists, when he wrote "On Religion," and in the unsatisfied longing we see echoed the "Ironie" of Schlegel. Religion starts with the Ego and revelation, portrays his longings, feelings and sadness and finally absorbs him in the Infinite. So peace can be secured. Schlegel gives the problem of strife and Schleiermacher answers with religion, aided by art. "Lucinde," he opposed and yet found that it contained his own theory of the union of soul and body. Later he breaks from the Romanticists; from the mere exaltation of feeling and intuition (*Gefühl und Anschauung*) to a feeling which gives reality to knowledge and a substance to morals and his religion becomes historical and positive. This feeling of absolute dependence in monotheism produces the harmony of the Ego and the Infinite.

7. Schlegel's Effect:

A.

On the dramas of Grillparzer and the poetry of Lenau, the effect of "Ironie" is felt. Grillparzer depicts the conflict of will and circumstances; his novels are full of the bitterness of disappointed hopes, a cry for inspiration, or the mockery of unhappy love. In "Das goldene Vlies," no rest comes; all is strife and sorrow; it is a tragedy of pessimism:

"Was ist der Erde Glück?—Ein Schatten!

Was ist der Erde Ruhm?—Ein Traum!"¹

"Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen" is a love-tragedy ending in the death of Hero and Leander; "Der Traum ein Leben" depicts desire and ambition, without power of realization; it represents a dream full of terror and on awakening Rustan decides:

"Des Innern stiller Frieden

Und die schuldbefreite Brust!

Und die Grösse ist gefährlich,

Und der Ruhm ein leeres Spiel;

Was er gibt, sind nichtige Schatten,

Was er nimmt, es ist zu viel!"²

Grillparzer sought this "inner peace"; the nothingness of fame, of happiness and love is the burden of all his plays. The noblest form of heroism is renunciation, the highest virtue is contentment.

Nikolaus Lenau's poems are full of melancholy pessimism and discontent. All his poems, elegaic and pessimistic, are filled with

¹ Sämmtliche Werke 5—228 (Stuttgart 1892-94).

² Werke 7—214f.

despair; he voices the pessimism of his time, the inability to realize the ideal. His works are depressing. Even when he seeks freedom in America, he calls it a land "*voll träumerischen Trug*," and returns to Europe. "Faust" is full of scepticism and despair and "Savonarola" and "Die Albigenser" are pessimistic.

B.

In the realm of philosophy, with Schopenhauer, the endless play, the "Ironie" becomes irrationalism. Here we have the absolute unreason of an objectless will. "The world is my idea,"¹ existing only in relation to the Self; otherwise it has no reality. "The world is my will,"² that is, the will is objectified in various grades of inorganic life, plant, animal and man. All gravitation, locomotion and growth, in fact, all forces are only will. The will creates itself perpetually and is never satisfied; so misery ensues. The will is the thing-in-itself, and life and the phenomenal world, the mirror of the will, or its objectivity. By negation of the will-to-live, misery will be lightened by morality. By art and science, misery will be overcome. Art will emancipate man as "the beautiful is that which pleases without stirring the will." In art, the artist becomes absorbed in nature, feels the sublimity and loses himself in the contemplation of infinite greatness. He feels himself, as the condition of all objective existence; he transcends his own individuality and becomes one with nature. In painting, he feels the objectification of his inner nature and communicates it. We may use the Hindoo formula "*tat twam asi*" (the living thing art thou) to express these objective manifestations.

A genius, Schopenhauer says, has a surplus of energy; "it is as if, when genius appears in an individual, a far larger measure of the power of knowledge falls to his lot than is necessary for the service of an individual will, and this superfluity of knowledge, being free, now becomes subject purified from will, a clear mirror of the inner nature of the world."³

This denial of the will, this freedom, is only partial denial, as all are not artists, nor can we be æsthetical all the time. All can be moral all the time, however, so we can obtain complete denial by moral asceticism. In religious art, resignation is expressed as the spirit of Christianity and Indian philosophy. Tragedy represents the strife of will with itself; purified by suffering, it becomes quiet and resigned.

¹ The World as Will and Idea—Bk. I, § 1.

² Ibid., Bk. II, § 18.

³ Ibid., Bk. III, § 36.

Time in all phenomena (Kant), becoming and never being (Plato), and the web of Maya (Vedanta) are all dependent on the principle of sufficient reason. The will is life, the will-to-live; it belongs to the present, not past, nor future. The world is will and phenomenon is will objectified. There is negation of the will, but if no will, there is no world—nothing. As we abhor annihilation, we will-to-live and are nothing but will; all strife, a weary longing and complaining without aim or end. To those that deny the will, as ascetics and sufferers as Goethe's "Gretchen," peace will come and salvation.

We assume three extremes in life: first, Radscha-Guna, the powerful active will, or the strong passion, which appears in great historical characters; second, pure knowing, the freeing of knowledge from the will, the life of genius or purity (Sattwa-Guna); third, lethargy of the will, or ignorance, empty longing (Tama-Guna). The Ego wavers between these, suffering, longing and dreaming until death comes. Life is a tragedy of never satisfied wishes and frustrated hopes. "By contemplation of the life and conduct of saints and by art, we banish nothingness which is behind all virtue and holiness as their goal; we do not evade it as the Hindoo, by reabsorption in Brahma or Nirvana."¹ We acknowledge that after the abolition of will, nothing remains. Our world is nothing; all is no more.

On the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Wagner worked out a theory of music. Schopenhauer writes "Music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself . . . it is not like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the copy of the will itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are."² Wagner accepts this theory that music is based on the will. Tone forces its way into the world, as the immediate utterance of the will. It represents the greatest excitation of the will. Plastic art is merely a representation by means of the intellect and is distinguished by greatest quietude of the will. Wagner also makes use of the "*Spieltrieb*" of Schiller and the allegorical "dream" of Novalis.

The musician is "like one, who awakening from deepest sleep, uses all his efforts in vain in the endeavor to recall the blissful dream of his soul."³ We awaken with a cry, and we immediately enter the world of sound. So art, arises from a cry. In plastic art, we feel repose in perceiving the object presented to our view, but not so in music. Music is an idea in Self. It is not beheld, but is felt in the depths of consciousness. The outer world disappears. Music occupies all our

¹ Ibid., Bk. IV, § 71.

² Bk. III, § 52.

³ On Beethoven, trans. by A. R. Parsons, p. 69.

attention, now creating the highest joy, now moving us to tears. The musician cries from his inmost soul, and the most certain answer is given by music. It can stir and arouse our sympathies. Music is sublime; it can cause the highest ecstasy and with Christianity can exclaim "Our kingdom is not of this World." It is like the revelation of a dream, like the cry of fright on awakening from a fearful dream. The will calls from within, which is answered by a counter-call from without. "So call and counter-call become a 'play' with itself."¹ The power of producing something, to set forth the never-experienced, the never-seen in joy. "All the pain of existence is shattered upon the immense pleasure derived from the play with it."²

This seems to argue that art will relieve and overcome the pain found in the world of Schopenhauer. The great artist may laugh at misery. He belongs to another realm. After a portrayal of anguish, unfulfilled desire, torment, rage, love, misery, sorrow, or rapture, the mighty player smiles to himself, for the incantation was to him, after all, only a "play."³ The spirit of music soars aloft from within the consciousness, leading us in the path of redemption. Art will emancipate man. Music is a cry of the composer's soul, striving to set forth the ideas he feels.

Like the "*Thathandlung*" of Fichte's Ego, the "*Spieltrieb*" of Schiller and Kant, the "*Ironie*" of Schlegel, "*der Traum*" of Novalis, the striving of Schleiermacher and Schelling, the unreason of Schopenhauer's will, is the call from the soul of the musician. All reach out for a goal too far removed. All is a dream of something that never was and never will be.

Friedrich Nietzsche applies Schopenhauer's thought to Wagner's musical drama, presenting art as a salvation from the torture of the will. Certainly this seems true. In "*Tannhäuser*," "*Lohengrin*" and "*Der fliegende Holländer*," we see the powers of darkness, or evil, opposed to those of light. In each, we find salvation sought through a woman's love. Redemption comes only with the death of the one tested. In "*Der Ring des Nibelungen*," is set forth the struggle for the ring. It is obtained successively by Alberic, the Nibelung, Fafnir the Giant, and Siegfried; but what does it bring them? Only death and unhappiness till the Rhine-maidens get back their own. The curse of the ring and its powers are destroyed but the race of Volsungs is ended and "*Götterdämmerung*" has come. The waking of Brunhilde brought only disappointment.

¹ Ibid., p. 31.

² p. 64.

³ p. 73.

In "Tristan and Isolde," Wagner's theme of love is once more portrayed. No fulfillment of happiness in life; in death they are united. "Happiness cannot overtake the swift course of woe." "Rienzi," Wagner's earliest opera, sets forth the story of the "Last of the Roman Tribunes." His ambition to free Rome ends only in the destruction of the capitol by those he sought to liberate, and in the death of Rienzi and his devoted sister, Irene. His life was sacrificed to the love he bore Rome.

"Parsifal," his last drama, is festive and yet is full of evil and temptation. Finally, wise through pity, Parsifal heals Amfortas, and redeems Kundry, who dies. Then the Grail glows with light, and a white dove descends in heavenly benediction; but even in the exaltation of Parsifal, we know that Titurel must now die. This last is a sort of transfigured pessimism. We feel in "Parsifal" also the fatalism of the East and Nirvana.

Nietzsche began as a follower of Schopenhauer and Wagner, but finally worked out a new philosophy for man's salvation. He creates heroes, and the hero, the "*Ueberschensch*" is the man with the strong will, the self-asserting genius, who has risen above his fellows and rules them. This assertion of individualism is like that of the Romantic pioneers. Mankind is to be ruled by the tyranny of culture, the "*Ueberschensch*." "*Die Umwerthung aller Werthe*," and "*Die Wiederherstellung des Gleichen*," (cf. Zarathustra and Confucius), represent the writer's philosophy. He had in his nature much of Schlegel's genius, which is based on "Ironie." He could not find his way back from the individual mind to the universal Ego, to the conception of values, which are valid for all.¹

In Herman Sudermann, we find embodied the realism of life; the feelings of evil and misery set forth in Schopenhauer. Poverty, dishonor, loss of love of home through ambition are portrayed in his works; in his last cycle called "Roses," he continues the mysterious reality and dark side of life and each closes with disappointment and unattained hopes.

Gerhart Hauptmann also writes in a crude realistic manner. "Die Weber" and "Vor Sonnenaufgang" are full of misery, "Hanneles Himmelfahrt," full of naturalism and romanticism, a wretched family and the vanishing dream of a child. "Die versunkene Glocke" is a Märchendrama, full of imagination and symbolism. The bell founder, Heinrich, seeking the ideal, typifies human aspiration; he leaves the

¹ Windeband Hist. of Phil. p. 680.

realistic figures of his home to follow Rautendelein, the fairy who typifies the freedom of the soul and lends him strength to climb the heights. His egoistic ambition ends in death. The piece is filled with the self-assertion of the will and the end of ambition in death.

Heinrich Ibsen is a pessimist and an idealist. He portrays the gloomy, sombre side of life; he argues that life must be purified by love and based upon individual will. In "Peer Gynt," the "Be thyself; to thyself be sufficient," is the prevailing theme. In Brand, "I am what I am." Both men failed; their freedom kills. We must compromise—"Go roundabout." Like the Bhagavat Gita "Nothing is greater than I," like the will of Schopenhauer, so is the Ego of Ibsen. The doctor in "Peer Gynt" declares "Each one shuts himself up in the barrel of self; with the self-bung he seals it hermetically." The Ego is all. In "The Master Builder," ambition meets with death as it did in Hauptmann's "Die versunkene Glocke."

These three authors emphasize the power of the Ego and his will, and are examples of Schopenhauer's influence, and in turn, of Schlegel's "Ironie."

Schopenhauer returned to Vedanta and his work is filled with the Asiatic pessimism. "In the world, there is no study so beneficial and elevating as that of the Oupnek'hat. It has been the solace of my life; it will be the solace of my death."

His own philosophy of the objectified Ego contains much of the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishads. He makes frequent reference to the "*tat twam asi*" and the Maya, or deceptive web of the world. He thinks the pantheism of India, is destined, sooner or later, to become the faith of the people. "*Ex oriente lux.*" As the Hindoo philosophy ends in annihilation of the Self, Schopenhauer would abolish will and thus the world would be—nothing. His pessimism excludes all hope of a race development. It is a pessimism which ends in the negation of the will and the cessation of existence.

IV. CONCLUSION.

In the survey of Self as a subjective principle, as seen previously, a philosophy will culminate in nihilism; in Vedanta, there must be annihilation of Self and absorption in Brahman to attain Nirvana; with Socrates, he must deny his own Self in order to make others see the truth; in Christianity, the Self must be affirmed against the world, but must become one with the Infinite to find salvation, the individual must lose Self in order to find it again in the Kingdom of God; the Cartesian

Self must be blended in the one true substance, which is God. The Fichtean Ego strives in endless activity to realize itself in the self-positing world, which exists to develop the character of the Ego. With the Fichtean Ego is marked the transition to the Romantic School. Here the philosophy does not end in nihilism of the Self, but the endless activity will end in pessimism. The Ego posits a goal, but this is ever changing and never reached. The Romanticist starts in the pure idealism of Fichte; he sets up his own ideal, the fruit of his imagination. This activity is at first "mere play" but gradually the vague longing for the ideal "Die Ironie" develops into a vain struggle, a ceaseless strife for a goal, which when the Ego finds he cannot reach, envelops him in pessimism and misery. He sets up art, philosophy and religion as means for salvation in this painful kingdom of time and space, but they cannot fulfill the task imposed.

From a "mere play" of the faculty of the imagination, an outlet of superfluous energy, "Die Ironie" grew into a serious pessimism, into an aspect of life, which life Disraeli describes as "youth, a delusion; manhood, a struggle; old age, a regret." Ambition meets with reverse as Napoleon aiming to rule the world met his Waterloo; the hand of destiny is the "Ironie" of life.

The period that dawned with the "play" in art, poetry and philosophy, has set with a "*Weltschmerz*," casting the philosopher into the gloom of pessimism and irrationalism.

The Self as a ruling principle in philosophy culminates in nihilism of the Self, or in a painful pessimism, from which misery, no art, no philosophy, no religion has as yet proven the savior.



